Functional Analysis of the Plain-Error Rule by Spann, Girardeau A
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1983 
Functional Analysis of the Plain-Error Rule 
Girardeau A. Spann 
Georgetown University Law Center, spann@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1938 
 
71 Geo. L. J. 945 (1982-1983) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Functional Analysis of the Plain-Error Rule*
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN**
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I attempt to do two things at once. First, I attempt to analyze
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to conduct "plain-error" review of state court
decisions. The plain-error issue merits consideration not only because of its
intrinsic interest and arguable complexity, but also because the question
whether the Supreme Court is authorized to engage in plain-error review is an
open one that I would like to help resolve. My second objective, however, is
the more important of the two. In the context of analyzing plain-error review,
what I really want to do is analyze legal analysis itself. There are a variety of
ways to approach legal problems, which can be usefully divided into two cate-
gories. One category strikes me as sensible, the other as silly. In the process of
analyzing the plain-error issue, I hope to demonstrate which is which.
The plain-error issue raises fundamental questions about the scope of
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts. The Supreme
Court appears to have authorized itself to correct plain errors of federal law
that state courts have tolerated, even though procedural irregularities would
otherwise deprive the Court of jurisdiction to consider the errors. Apparently,
the Court reviews the errors because it considers them too important to disre-
gard. As a technical matter, the Court's asserted plain-error power is curious
because it has been exercised without explicit regard for certain federalism-
based jurisdictional doctrines thought to circumscribe the proper scope of
Supreme Court activity. When those doctrines are considered, they raise ques-
tions about the propriety of plain-error review. In fact, an impressive array of
precedents can be marshalled in support of the proposition that the Supreme
Court simply does not possess jurisdiction to engage in plain-error review.
The same precedents, however, can be used to establish an equally strong case
supporting Supreme Court jurisdiction to engage in plain-error review, and
therein lies the problem.
Much of the legal analysis in opinions and articles constitutes nothing more
than case manipulation. Legal precedents are cited, discussed, followed, or
distinguished with considerable dexterity, and then the result is pronounced.
This mode of analysis, which I term "precedential," proceeds from the as-
sumption that, consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis, decided cases are
authorities that compel the results in subsequent cases unless the subsequent
cases can be distinguished from the precedents. However, precedents are inde-
terminate. They submit to such a broad range of interpretations that even a
moderately skillful legal analyst can manipulate them to produce contrary re-
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suits. I try to illustrate this in the plain-error context by developing two lines
of precedential arguments that reach contrary conclusions about the Supreme
Court's plain-error jurisdiction. I believe that each line of argument is as good
as the other and that no way exists, within a purely precedential framework, to
determine the proper resolution of the plain-error issue--or of any legal issue.
My primary motive is to illustrate the vacuous nature of precedential analysis,
in the hope that this will reduce the frequency with which such analysis recurs.
Despite the inability of precedential analysis to resolve the plain-error prob-
lem, the Supreme Court can readily be shown to possess plain-error jurisdic-
tion. I try to make such a showing using a mode of analysis that I term
"functional." Functional analysis resists the suggestion that precedent is capa-
ble of compelling or precluding any result. Born of the legal-realist tradition,
this mode of analysis embodies the belief that case results can be justified only
by persuasive arguments indicating that the results advance specified objec-
tives. Although many courts and commentators regularly engage in functional
analysis, I do not understand why all legal analysis is not functional. Applying
functional analysis to the prototypical plain-error case, I conclude that plain-
error review is justified because it advances our federalism objectives more
than they would be advanced in the absence of such review.
Part I of this article describes the Supreme Court's plain-error rule, discusses
the context out of which it has emerged, and considers the significance of the
rule. Part II contains, in essence, two legal briefs offering precedential justifi-
cations both for and against the plain-error rule. Part III contains a meaning-
ful, functional analysis of the plain-error rule and concludes that the rule is
justifiable because it sensibly advances desirable objectives.
Although people always will disagree about the desirability of particular
objectives, or the degree to which a given result advances or frustrates those
objectives, functional analysis is the most that we can hope for as an accepta-
ble mechanism for resolving these disputes. As long as members of society
disagree about goals and priorities, the actions of our legal system will neces-
sarily reflect those disagreements. A mode of analysis that purports to be
rooted in authoritative precedent tends to mask, rather than highlight, diver-
gent social desires and thereby obscures the very factors that should be at the
core of judicial decisionmaking. The value of functional analysis lies precisely
in its refusal to justify results through recourse to any authority higher than the
persuasiveness of the court's opinion. Viewed in this manner, functional analy-
sis will convince some and agitate others, but that is the best that can be
expected.
I. THE PLAIN-ERROR RULE
Rule 34.1(a) of the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States-the
plain-error rule-authorizes the Supreme Court, in its discretion, to consider a
plain error that is evident from the record before the Court, even if the error
has not been presented in accordance with prescribed procedures.' If the mat-
ter is otherwise within the Court's jurisdiction, rule 34.1(a) permits the Court
1. Rule 34 states in part:
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to correct an error "evident from the record. ' 2 The remainder of rule 34 speci-
fies additional requirements for the form and content of briefs, such as inclu-
sion of a table of contents and a table of authorities,3 a summary of argument,4
and a conclusion.5 In addition, the rule prescribes page limitations6 and speci-
fies the manner in which citations to the record or to the appendix should be
made.7
The context and content of rule 34 suggest that it is ministerial, not substan-
tive. The Supreme Court, however, has used the rule to resolve serious sub-
stantive questions relating to the Court's constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction. In Vachon v. New Hampshire8 the Supreme Court relied upon the
plain-error rule to justify the reversal of a criminal conviction on federal due
process grounds 9 when the parties had not raised the pertinent due process
argument in the lower courts.10 Normally, the Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction to consider questions not raised below.' Accordingly, the Court
has been accused of using the plain-error rule to expand the scope of its appel-
late jurisdiction.' 2 Closer scrutiny of the Vachon decision illustrates the poten-
1. A brief of an appellant or petitioner on the merits shall comply in all respects with Rule
33, and shall contain in the order here indicated:
(a) The questions presented for review, stated as required by [these rules]. The phras-
ing of the questions presented need not be identical with that set forth in the jurisdic-
tional statement or the petition for certiorari, but the brief may not raise additional
questions or change the substance of the questions already presented in those documents.
.4t its option, however, the Court may consider a plain error not among the questions
presented but evident from the record and otherwise within its discretion to decide.
Sup. CT. R. 34.1(a) (emphasis added). Authorization for plain-error review of criminal cases tried in
the federal courts has long been recognized. See FED. R. CRAM. P. 52(b) (plain errors affecting substan-
tial rights may be noticed even though not brought to court's attention).
2. Sup. CT. R. 34.1(a).
3. Sup. CT. R. 34.1(c).
4. Sup. CT. R. 34.1(h).
5. Sup. CT. R. 34.10).
6. Sup. CT. R. 34.3.
7. Sup. CT. R. 34.5.
8. 414 U.S. 478 (1974) (per curiam).
9. Id at 479 n.3, 480.
10. Id at 481 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438-39 (1969) (Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over state court judgments limited by statute to federal issues raised, preserved, or passed upon by state
court); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1945) (same); Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
368, 392 (1836) (same).
12. See Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. at 481-84 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J. & White, J.,
dissenting) (resolution of federal issue inconsistent with congressional limitation on Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction); see also P. BATOR, P. MISHiN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 130-32, 138-39 (2d ed. Supp. 1981)
(Supreme Court's jurisdictional reliance on plain-error rule "was, at the least, strained") [hereinafter
HART & WECHSLER].
It is possible to read Vachon as standing for only the limited proposition that when an issue is raised
in the state courts, but not made one of the "questions presented for review" within the meaning of
Supreme Court rule 34.1(a), the Supreme Court, nevertheless, may consider the question if it relates to
a plain error. Such a modest reading of the case avoids the jurisdictional issues raised in the text, but it
does not appear to fit the facts of the case. The Supreme Court reversed on the due process ground that
the record lacked any evidence of one of the essential elements of the crime. Although the per curiam
opinion stated that the appellant made sufficiency of the evidence arguments in the state courts, 414
U.S. at 478, the dissent pointed out that the appellant did not identify the arguments as constitutionally
based. Id at 482 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J. & White, J., dissenting). The dissenters viewed the
evidentiary arguments as a state law claim, not a federal constitutional challenge. Id Consequently,
they gave the case the broader reading that raises the jurisdictional issues, id at 481-84, as did the
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tial jurisdictional problems.
In Vachon the owner of a "head shop" was convicted by a New Hampshire
trial court of wilfully contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in violation
of a New Hampshire statute, after a fourteen-year-old girl purchased from his
store a twenty-five cent button bearing the slogan "Copulation not Masturba-
tion."13 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the conviction, 14 but
the United States Supreme Court reversed. It found that the record contained
no evidence of "wilfulness," an essential element of the offense as defined by
state law.'-
Although due process requires proof of each element of a criminal offense,16
Vachon never made to any court the wilfulness argument on which the
Supreme Court relied, sua sponte, to reverse his conviction. 17 In the state trial
court Vachon argued that, as a matter of state law, the statutory offense re-
quired proof that an adjudication of delinquency actually resulted from the
allegedly criminal act.18 He also argued that because the button was not ob-
scene, the act of selling the button was constitutionally protected by the first
amendment.19 After his conviction by the trial court, Vachon renewed those
arguments in the state supreme court, which rejected them and affirmed his
conviction.20 The state supreme court also ruled that, as a matter of state law,
the "wilfulness" requirement of the statute merely required proof that the act
complained of- sale of the button to a minor-was voluntary and intentional
rather than mistaken or accidental and held that the evidence proved such
wilfulness.21 One dissenting justice of the state supreme court argued that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague,22 although Vachon himself had not chal-
lenged the statute on vagueness grounds.23
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Vachon made two argu-
ments in his jurisdictional statement. First, he renewed his argument that the
Court itself in subsequent cases. See infra note 41 (discussing Supreme Court opinions that read
Vachon to permit plain-error review of issues not presented to state courts). Moreover, the commenta-
tors have given Vachon this broader reading, see HART & WECHSLER Supp., supra, at 130-32, and this
is the reading that I am prepared to defend.
At the time Vachon was decided, the plain-error rule, which was then contained in Supreme Court
rule 40(l)(d)(2), did not mention jurisdiction. The present incarnation of the rule, however, expressly
provides that the Supreme Court may consider plain errors that are "otherwise within its jurisdiction to
decide." Sup. CT. R. 34.1(a). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the amendment is of any consequence
here. Presumably, the Court considered the plain error reviewed in Vachon to be "otherwise within its
jurisdiction to decide" even though the rule in effect at the time did not expressly contain such a restric-
tion. Moreover, this article is designed, in part, to establish that the Court's review of the Vachon plain
error was well within its constitutional and statutory jurisdiction, regardless of which formulation of the
plain-error rule is considered. In my view, both the old and new versions of the rule have the same
meaning, and both authorize the Supreme Court's actions in Vachon.
13. New Hampshire v. Vachon, 113 N.H. 239, 240-41, 306 A.2d 781, 783 (1973).
14. Id at 243, 306 A.2d at 785.
15. 414 U.S. at 478-80.
16. Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1233 (1971); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206
(1960); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927).
17. See 414 U.S. at 481 (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J. & White, J., dissenting).
18. 113 N.H. at 241, 306 A.2d at 783.
19. Id, 306 A.2d at 783.
20. Id at 241-42, 306 A.2d at 783-84.
21. Id at 242, 306 A.2d at 784.
22. Id at 243-44, 306 A.2d at 785 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
23. See Jurisdictional Statement at 5-6, Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974).
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button was not obscene24 and asserted that the state had introduced no evi-
dence of obscenity.25 Second, Vachon argued that the statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague.26 In response to the jurisdictional statement, the state moved
the Court to dismiss the appeal for want of a substantial federal question or, in
the alternative, to affirm summarily Vachon's conviction.27 The Supreme
Court did not hear argument or receive briefs on the merits.28 Instead, on the
basis of the jurisdictional papers, the Court issued a per curiam opinion revers-
ing the conviction on due process grounds because the state introduced no
evidence that Vachon sold the button to a minor-a requirement that the
Court found to be encompassed by the wilfulness provision of the statute.
29
Justices Rehnquist and White and Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing
that because the issue had not been raised in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the due process sufficiency of the
evidence of wilfulness.30 The dissenters also argued that even if jurisdiction
did exist, the Court had improperly supplanted its own construction of the
wilfulness provision of the statute for that of the state supreme court by requir-
ing proof that Vachon personally sold the button.
31
The state moved for a rehearing, arguing that it had never received an op-
portunity to address the question of evidentiary sufficiency under the Supreme
Court's construction of the New Hampshire statute.32 The Supreme Court de-
nied the motion.33
For reasons that are unclear, the Supreme Court handled the Vachon case in
an unorthodox manner.34 The second prong of the dissenting opinion is cer-
tainly correct; the Court did rewrite the New Hampshire statute by superim-
posing a "personally" requirement on the state supreme court's construction of
the wilfulness provision. It is difficult to conceive of a theory of federalism
permitting the Supreme Court of the United States to overrule a state supreme
court on a question of state law.3 5 Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of any
legitimate function served by the Supreme Court's reconstruction of state law
that could not have been accomplished through less suspect means, such as
24. Id at 7-11.
25. Id at 10. Vachon cited Thompson v. Louisville, 326 U.S. 199 (1960), which permits reversal of a
criminal conviction when the record contains "no evidence" of an essential element of the criminal
offense. Id at 206.
26. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 23, at 11-15.
27. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974).
28. 414 U.S. at 487 (Rehnquist, J. with Burger, C.J. & White, J., dissenting).
29. 414 U.S. at 479-80.
30. Id at 481-84.
31. Id at 484-87.
32. Appelle's Motion for Rehearing, Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974).
33. 415 U.S. 952 (1974).
34. Perhaps the Supreme Court was sufficiently skeptical about the constitutionality of the state stat-
ute, at least as applied to Vachon, that it wished to reverse the conviction, but was not skeptical enough
to actually declare the statute unconstitutional.
35. But see infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (citing cases). The most flattering interpreta-
tion that I can venture for the Court's action is that, in essence, it imposed a saving construction on the
New Hampshire statute. In this regard, consider Professor Tusbnets suggestion that the Court did not
rewrite the statute, but, in effect, held the New Hampshire statute unconstitutional as applied because
Vachon's behavior was constitutionally protected. See Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive
Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REv. 775, 795-99
(1975).
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invalidating the statute as applied. Yet, as striking as the Court's actions were
in this regard, it is the first prong of the dissent's indictment that is of concern
for present purposes.
The dissent emphasized that the due process ground upon which the major-
ity based its reversal-the lack of sufficient evidence of wilfulness-was never
asserted in the state courts. 36 As a matter of administrative preference, the
Supreme Court normally declines to consider an issue not raised in the lower
courts because initial lower-court consideration of the issue, as well as the de-
velopment of a proper factual record, facilitates Supreme Court resolution of
the issue.37 When a case reaches the Supreme Court from a state court system,
however, the restriction on resolving issues not raised below arguably becomes
jurisdictional, rather than merely a matter of administrative preference.
Two possible limitations on the exercise of Supreme Court appellate juris-
diction exist with respect to issues not raised in the state courts. First, the
Supreme Court has stated that its appellate jurisdiction is limited by statute to
federal questions that the record reveals were both raised in and decided by
state courts of last resort.3 8 Second, as a constitutional matter, when a state
procedural rule permits a state court of last resort to decline to consider issues
not raised in a timely manner in the state court system, reliance on such a rule
constitutes an independent state law basis for the judgment, which arguably
deprives the Supreme Court of article III jurisdiction to consider the federal
issue.39 If the Supreme Court vacates a state court decision because of a plain
error of federal law not raised in the state court system, the state court, apply-
ing its timely-presentation requirement, is free to reinstate its original decision.
The litigant's failure to make timely presentation of the federal issue to the
state court amounts to a procedural default sufficient to serve as a purely state
law basis for the decision. Thus, the decision is immunized from further
Supreme Court review because of the absence of any federal question.
The Vachon majority did not discuss the possible limitations on the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. It did, however, indicate awareness of the problems
posed, by citing the plain-error rule as authority for its exercise of jurisdic-
tion.40 In addition, the Court has continued to cite Vachon, which suggests that
it is more than a mere aberration in the law of Supreme Court jurisdiction.41
Assuming that the jurisdictional problems surrounding the Vachon case are
36. 414 U.S. at 478. The parties never even raised the issue in the Supreme Court. Id
37. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1971) (discussing policy reasons underlying require-
ment that issues be raised below); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969) (same).
38. See, e.g., Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203,
206-07 (1945); Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 392 (1836).
39. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 463-68 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (adequate and independent
state ground of decision, whether procedural or substantive, constitutionally bars Supreme Court re-
view of state court judgment).
40. 414 U.S. at 479.
41. In Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), the Court cited Vachon as authorizing the Supreme
Court to consider plain errors of federal law regardless of whether the pertinent federal issues had been
raised in the state courts. Id at 265 n.5. In Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 501 n.5 (1981), the majority
cited both Vachon and Wood to illustrate that the Court has not at all times been of a single mind
concerning the need for prior presentation of an issue to the state courts. In the same case, however,
Justices Powell and Brennan read both Vachon and Wood to authorize squarely Supreme Court review




real rather than illusory,42 the Supreme Court's use of the plain-error rule to
overcome them is quite significant. The Court saw no need to justify its exer-
cise of jurisdiction through recourse to any of the doctrines it traditionally uses
to engulf cases on the periphery of its appellate jurisdiction.43 Rather, the
Court's exclusive reliance on the plain-error rule was tantamount to a holding
that the Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction simply because a plain error had
been committed. The Supreme Court has construed "plain error" to mean a
"serious error" that, if uncorrected, could result in a "miscarriage of justice." 44
Read for all that it is worth, therefore, Vachon stands for the proposition that
the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to correct serious errors of federal
law and that nothing more than the presence of such an error is required to
trigger the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the prototypical plain-
error case is one in which the sole basis of Supreme Court appellate jurisdic-
tion is the presence of a plain error of federal law that was not properly raised
in the state courts.45 Less extreme readings of Vachon are possible,46 but the
more expansive reading is the one that I am prepared to defend-first on prec-
edential grounds and then on more meaningful functional grounds.
II. PRECEDENTIAL ARGUMENTS
The traditional mode of legal analysis requires courts to follow precedents
they deem controlling.47 In my view, however, within the range of options that
are available to a judge as a political and practical matter, precedent does vir-
tually nothing to constrain the judge's discretion. In this sense, precedent is
infinitely manipulable. The only limitations on a judge's ability to establish
that precedent supports a given result derive from limitations on the judge's
own persuasive skills.48 If my view concerning the manipulability of precedent
42. See infra text accompanying notes 254-83 (suggesting seriousness of these problems is generally
overstated).
43. See infra notes 47-240 (discussing doctrines).
44. United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1592 (1982); see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 421
n.19 (1976) (Court has authority to recognize unassigned errors that "seriously affect the fairness, integ-
rity or public reputation of judicial proceedings") (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160
(1936)); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362 n.16 (1957) (Court recognizes plain error in excep-
tional circumstances); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 16 (1940) (Court recognizes plain errors of
a "fundamental nature"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1909) (Court less reluctant to
recognize plain error when constitutional right is claimed).
45. It is likely that such errors will be constitutional as they were in Vachon. Cf. Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1909) (when constitutional rights involved, Court less reluctant to review
issues not raised below and to correct plain errors of law).
46. See supra note 12.
47. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70 (precedents and rules must be followed unless flatly
absurd and unjust); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881) (new decisions follow syllogistically
from existing precedents); see also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 519, 522, 527-28 (1975) (prior
cases dispose of issue raised by current dispute; doctrine of stare decisis powerful force in American
jurisprudence); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1972) (doctrine of stare decisis mandates that
prior cases control in subsequent case raising same issue).
48. The manipulability of doctrine follows from observations made by the legal realists and others
concerning the indeterminacy of legal rules. See In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (1943)
(Frank, J.) (prejudices and preconceptions shared by society, as well as idiosyncratic sympathies of
judge, find expression in society's legal system); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xiii, 115 (6th
ed. 1963) (judges' temperament, training, biases, and predilections influence decisions); K. LLEWEL-
LYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrrION: DECIDING APPEALS 1-18, 393 (1960) (human psychology, particu-
lar circumstances, and inherent probabilities create nonuniform pattern of decisions); ef Fuller,
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is correct, equally strong precedential cases can be made for and against the
Court's plain-error power. This section endeavors to make those cases.
A. THE PRECEDENTS PRECLUDE PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW
The decision of the Supreme Court in Vachon is unprecedented. It appears
to authorize the Court to engage in plain-error review-review undertaken in
derogation of state procedural rules solely because of the asserted importance
of the error-without even discussing the serious problems that such review
entails. When those problems are considered in conjunction with the control-
ling precedents, proper resolution of the plain-error issue becomes as free from
doubt as any legal issue reasonably can be. Throughout our history, in case
after case, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its lack of jurisdiction to review
federal questions that were not properly presented in the state courts. Thus, in
Crowell v. Randell,49 the touchstone case concerning Supreme Court review of
state court decisions, Justice Story, after carefully considering every applicable
precedent, was able to state for a unanimous Supreme Court:
These are all the cases, it is believed, in which the construction of
the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act [authorizing the Supreme
Court to review specified state court decisions] has been made matter
of controversy; and they extend over a period of more than twenty-
five years. They exhibit a uniformity of interpretation of that section,
which has never been broken in upon. . . . The period seems now
to have arrived in which the court should, upon a full review of all
the cases, with a view to close, if possible, all future controversy on
the point, reaffirm the interpretation which they have constantly
maintained. It is, that to bring a case within the twenty-fifth section
of the Judiciary Act, it must appear on the face of the record, 1st.
That some one of the questions stated in that section did arise in the
State Court. . . . 4th. That it is not sufficient to show that a question
might have arisen or been applicable to the case, unless it is further
shown, on the record, that it did arise, and was applied by the State
Court to the case. 50
The Court found the proposition that it so forcefully asserted to have been
originally established by Chief Justice Marshall in Owings v. Norwood's
American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. Rav. 429, 435-38 (1934) (judges often decide cases on policy
grounds, then "wring" from legal doctrine a legally acceptable basis for decision).
The critical legal scholars have accepted and expanded upon the realists' observations concerning the
indeterminacy of doctrine. See Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1383, 1384-
88 (discussing failure of policy analysis, which was offered to meet realists' criticisms of indeterminacy
of legal doctrine); see also Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical
Legal Scholarship, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1669-1676-82 (1982) (contemporary critical legal scholars repre-
sent maturation of realists' exploration of legal incoherencies).
49. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368 (1836).
50. Id at 398 (emphasis added). Although the language in Crowell directly addresses the statute
regulating Supreme Court jurisdiction, the statutory restrictions themselves have constitutional dimen-
sions. See infra text accompanying note 78 (exceptions and regulations clause allows congressional
limitation of Supreme Court jurisdiction).
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Lessee, the first case to consider the issue,51 and since then to have been fol-
lowed consistently. 52 The cases decided from the period of Crowell into the
modem era have adhered religiously to the principle that the Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction to review questions not raised in the state courts. 53 Although
more than one hundred fifty Supreme Court decisions have addressed the issue
since Crowell was decided,54 not a single case has ever held that the Supreme
Court may review an issue not properly presented to the state courts. 55
The only exception is, of course, Vachon. To the extent that the three-page
Vachon decision can be read to authorize plain-error review,56 however, it is
simply unpersuasive when measured against the overwhelming weight of con-
trary authority.57 Therefore, any contention that the Supreme Court may re-
view a federal question not properly presented to the state court solely because
of the asserted importance of a federal issue involved in the case is wholly
without merit. In fact, the argument is exactly backwards. Because the perti-
nent restrictions on Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction have constitutional,
as well as statutory underpinnings, the more important the federal issue, the
less likely it is that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
1. The Supreme Court Does Not Possess Article III Jurisdiction to Engage
in Plain-Error Review
As a constitutional matter, the Supreme Court possesses only that jurisdic-
tion granted to it by article III, and article III limits the jurisdiction of all
federal courts to enumerated "cases" and "controversies. s58 Plain-error review
51. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 392-93 (citing Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 344, 347-51
(1809)).
52. See 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 398 (noting consistent application of prior presentation requirement).
53. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 206-07
(1945);see also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 799 (1972) (due process issue not properly presented for
review because not raised in state court).
54. The annotations in The United States Supreme Court Digest, under "Appeal and Error" §§ 410-
42, reveal well over one hundred fifty cases that have reaffirmed the proposition asserted in Crowell
See 2 WEsT's UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DIGmEsT Appeal and Error §§ 410-42 (1943) (citing
cases).
55. The only cases, prior to Vachon, in which the failure to raise an issue in the state courts did not
bar subsequent Supreme Court review were those cases in which the applicable state procedural rules
were either "inadequate" or were not "independent" of the federal issue serving as the basis for
Supreme Court jurisdiction. See infra notes 106-25 and accompanying text (discussing narrow and
specific exceptions to prior-presentation rule). Although proponents of plain-error review assert that
the applicable case holdings permit the Court to consider federal issues not raised below, see infra notes
201-23 and accompanying text, they misconstrue the cases on which they rely, see infra notes 126-40
and accompanying text.
56. A much more limited reading of Vachon, which makes it consistent with all of the precedents, is
possible. See supra note 12.
57. Although subsequent cases have cited Vachon, they have done so in dicta. See Webb v. Webb,
451 U.S. 493, 501 n.5 (1981) (holding that writ of certiorari must be dismissed because federal issue not
raised in or decided by state courts); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 265 n.5 (1981) (holding that due
process issue raised, but not decided below, and not raised on appeal or in petition for certiorari, should
be remanded for consideration by trial court). No subsequent case has held that plain-error review is
proper. Moreover, in each case that cited Vachon, there was an independent basis for Supreme Court
jurisdiction. See Webb, 451 U.S. at 494 (jurisdiction based on full faith and credit claim raised in state
court); Wood, 450 U.S. at 262, 264 (jurisdiction based on equal protection claim raised and decided in
state court).
58. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 provides:
Thejludicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
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exceeds the scope of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisdiction in two
distinct ways. Plain-error cases do not present cases or controversies within
the meaning of article III, and they do not accord proper respect to state proce-
dural laws as required by the federalism limitations embodied in article III.
Thus, the Supreme Court does not possess constitutional jurisdiction to engage
in plain-error review.
Plain-error eview exceeds the article 111 power of the Supreme Court to decide
cases and controversies. Article III of the Constitution limits the juris-
diction of all federal courts, including the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, to "cases" and "controversies. '59 Since the earliest days of the nation,
the Supreme Court has construed the case or controversy provision of article
III to preclude the issuance by federal courts of advisory opinions--opinions
that have no legal effect on the rights of the parties.60 The issuance of advisory
opinions is constitutionally prohibited because courts exceed the bounds of the
judicial function in our tripartite system of government when they engage in
unnecessary legal exposition.6 1
Supreme Court review of a plain error not raised in the state court exceeds
the article III jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because the Supreme Court's
decision is tantamount to an advisory opinion. When the decision of a state
court rests on state law grounds that are both independent of any federal issue
and adequate to support the judgment, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to
review the decision of the state court.62 This is true because, in light of the state
law basis for the decision, no ruling by the Supreme Court on the federal issue
can change the outcome. Even if the state court disregarded or wrongly re-
solved a federal issue, its judgment nevertheless has to be affirmed on state law
Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citi-
zens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;---between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which
a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
Id (emphasis added).
59. Id
60. See "Correspondence of the Justices (1793)," 3 JOHNSTON, CORRESPONDENCES AND PUBLIC PA-
PERS OF JOHN JAY 486-89 (1891), reprinted in HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 64-66 (refusing
requested advisory opinion on basis of framer's intent and negative inference drawn from constitu-
tional provision permitting executive departments to render advisory opinions); see also Flast v. Co-
hen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-96 (1968) (advisory opinions represent improper exercise of judicial power);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1910) (judicial power requires actual controversy be-
tween adverse litigants).
61. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-23 (1974) (consideration
of constitutional issues in abstract--outside of context surrounding concrete injury-creates potential
for abuse of judicial process and distortion ofjudicial role in relation to other branches); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-93 (1974) (consideration of legal issues in abstract would significantly
alter allocation of power at national level with shift away from democratic form of government); Froth-
ingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923) (judicial power to review acts of co-equal branches
limited to cases brought by party suffering or in immediate danger of suffering direct injury); see also
Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. - (1983).
62. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
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grounds. Stated differently, the Supreme Court does not have article III juris-
diction because any action that it takes is merely advisory.63
Whenever plain-error review is at issue, there is of necessity an adequate
and independent state law basis for the state court's decision. All state court
systems have legitimate procedural rules, and the failure ever to present an
issue to the state courts would, with virtual certainty, violate at least one such
procedural rule with respect to that issue. 64 In essence, such procedural rules
provide, as a matter of state law, that if an issue is not raised in the prescribed
manner, it can never thereafter be raised; it is simply not an issue in the case.
As long as the state procedural rule is a valid constitutional rule, the Supreme
Court must honor it because the Court does not have the power to alter or
excuse noncompliance with valid state laws.65 The procedural default inherent
in all plain-error cases, therefore, constitutes an adequate and independent
state law basis for the decision and requires Supreme Court aflirmance. Ac-
cordingly, if the Court considers the federal issue, even though it cannot
change the outcome, it is engaged in the issuance of an unauthorized advisory
opinion.
The Supreme Court adopted precisely this line of reasoning in Herb v. Pit-
cairn,66 when it reaffirmed its lack of jurisdiction to consider federal issues in
cases in which the judgment of the state court was supported by a valid state
law.67 The Court stated:
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the prin-
ciple that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest on
adequate and independent state grounds. The reason is so obvious
that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement. It is found in
the partitioning of power between the state and Federal judicial sys-
tems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power
over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incor-
rectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judg-
ments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an
advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the
state court after we corrected its views of Federal laws, our review
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion. 68
63. See id at 126.
64. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the failure to present a federal issue to the state
courts would not violate a state procedural rule and thereby exclude the issue from consideration in
subsequent proceedings in the case. If such a situation did exist, however, there would be no state-law
bar to Supreme Court consideration of the issue and no need for the Supreme Court to invoke the
plain-error rule.
65. See Murdock v. Mayor of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874); see also L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301-02 (1978) (Congress may lack power to authorize Supreme Court
review of state court judgments of state law); Hart, 7he Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 499, 503 (1954) (Court has never had power to review state court decisions on
questions of state law); cf. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1859) (state and federal
sovereigns are separate and distinct). But see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 356-60
(1816) (arguably overruling state supreme court on question of state law). See also infra note 182
(citing cases in which Supreme Court arguably overruled state courts on issue of state contract law).
66. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
67. Id at 125-26.
68. Id (citations omitted); see also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1965) (Court declines
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The dangers of advisory opinions highlight the perverse nature of plain-er-
ror review. Whenever a court expounds upon the meaning of federal law-
especially constitutional law-the danger exists that the court will make a mis-
take, thereby causing private parties to tailor their behavior to an erroneous
view of the Constitution and laws of the United States. In addition, there is a
danger that the actions of the coordinate branches of government will be im-
properly constrained, thereby eroding the essence of separation of powers. Ac-
cordingly, advisory opinions are constitutionally unacceptable because they
pose all the dangers of judicial exposition with none of the benefits. Because
gratuitous exposition cannot aid the parties by altering the outcome, these dan-
gers are incurred unnecessarily. Advocates of plain-error review assert that
these considerations should be ignored when the federal issue is especially im-
portant or fundamental. 69 Yet, the more important the federal issue-the more
widespread or fundamental the effect on private parties and coordinate
branches of government-the graver become the dangers inherent in exposi-
tion. Therefore, it is precisely in plain-error cases that the advisory opinion
restriction should be adhered to most closely. It is precisely in plain-error
cases that the lack of Supreme Court constitutional jurisdiction is most
apparent.70
Plain-error review violates the federalism limitations embodied in article III
Herb v. Pitcairn reveals yet another reason why plain-error review exceeds the
scope of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisdiction. Because plain-error
review negates the effect of valid state procedural rules, it offends the require-
ments of federalism embodied in the Constitution.71 Under our constitutional
scheme of government, state courts-not the United States Supreme Court-
are the final arbiters of state law, and the Supreme Court must give effect to
state laws unless they are unconstitutional.72 In exercising plain-error review,
the Supreme Court, by hypothesis, is not prepared to declare the pertinent
state procedural rules unconstitutional. If it were, the constitutionality of the
procedural rules would itself pose a federal question sufficient to serve as the
basis for Supreme Court review, and reliance on the plain-error rule to estab-
review of state court judgments that rest on adequate and independent state law grounds, whether
substantive or procedural).
69. See infira notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
70. Proponents of plain-error review argue that the issuance of an advisory opinion will not result
from plain error-review because the Supreme Court will rely on the plain-error to reverse or vacate the
state court judgment. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text. This argument is misdirected,
however. It addresses a situation in which the state court judgment is reversed because the pertinent
state procedural rule is unconstitutional as applied. By hypothesis, that cannot be the situation
presented in plain-error cases.
In plain-error cases, the state procedural rule must be valid as applied. Otherwise there would be no
need to rely on the plain-error rule for jurisdiction; the unconstitutionality of the procedural rule itself
would serve as the basis for Supreme Court jurisdiction. Because the Supreme Court cannot constitu-
tionally modify or disregard a valid state law, see supra note 65 (citing authority), it cannot reverse the
state court judgment, and its opinion, therefore, is necessarily advisory.
To the extent that Vachon appears to be inconsistent with this principle, it is because Vachon-if
properly decided-was not a plain-error case at all. Rather, it was a case in which the Supreme Court
simply reversed on the basis of an unconstitutional application of a state procedural rule.
71. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 125-26 (partitioning of power between state and federal judicial
systems requires that Supreme Court abstain from review of state court judgments that rest on adequate
and independent state grounds).
72. See supra note 65 (citing authority).
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lish Supreme Court jurisdiction would be unnecessary. Rather, in exercising
plain-error review, the Supreme Court refuses to give effect to the applicable
state procedural rules despite their validity. This is something that the consti-
tutional concept of federalism does not permit.
The federalism limitation on Supreme Court jurisdiction was described most
cogently by Justice Harlan in his opinion in Fay v. Noia. 73 After emphasizing
that the rule prohibiting review of decisions supported by adequate and in-
dependent state grounds was constitutional, not statutory, 74 Justice Harlan
went on to explain:
For this court to go beyond the adequacy of the state ground and to
review and determine the correctness of that ground on its merits
would. . . be to assume full control over a State's procedures for the
administration of its own criminal justice. This is and must be be-
yond our power if the federal system is to exist in substance as well as
form. The right of the State to regulate its own procedures governing
the conduct of litigants in its courts, and its interest in supervision of
those procedures, stand on the same constitutional plane as its right
and interest in framing "substantive" laws governing other aspects of
the conduct of those within its borders.75
Although Justice Harlan made these remarks in dissent in Fay v. Noia, the
majority's disagreement with his views related only to the question whether the
federalism limitations that he described applied to federal district courts on
habeas corpus review. Every member of the Fay Court agreed that a proce-
dural default would divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to review the
decision of a state court on direct review.76 Indeed, the bulk of the majority
opinion consisted of elaborate efforts to distinguish habeas corpus review from
direct review, so that habeas corpus actions could be freed from the federalism
constraints that were uniformly recognized to limit the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court on direct review.77 Accordingly, the Supreme Court lacks arti-
cle III jurisdiction to engage in plain-error review because such review would
violate the federalism limitations embodied in article III.
In sum, Supreme Court plain-error review raises two problems. The Court's
asserted plain-error power necessarily entails issuance of advisory opinions.
Moreover, plain-error review denies the effectiveness of valid state laws that
the Supreme Court has no authority to disregard. Both of these problems are
of constitutional dimensions, and both illustrate a distinct way in which plain-
error review exceeds the scope of the Supreme Court's article III jurisdiction.
An additional reason, however, supports the argument that plain-error review
exceeds the Supreme Court's constitutional power. Not only is the constitu-
tional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court limited by those provisions of article
III that operate of their own force, but also, by virtue of the exceptions and
regulations clause, it is limited by any statutory restrictions that Congress im-
73. 372 U.S. 391, 463-68 (1963) (Harlan, J., with Clark & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
74. Id at 464.
75. Id at 466-67.
76. See id at 428-30.
77. See id at 399-435. Because habeas corpus review is significantly different than direct Supreme
Court review, plain-error advocates who argue that habeas corpus cases establish article III jurisdiction
to engage in plain-error review, see infra notes 162-73, are unpersuasive.
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poses on the Court's jurisdiction.78 Congress has taken great pains to impose
such restrictions in a manner that directly precludes plain-error review.
2. The Supreme Court Does Not Possess Statutory Jurisdiction to Engage
in Plain-Error Review
As a statutory matter, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to en-
gage in plain-error review of cases decided by state courts. Both Congress and
the Supreme Court itself have repeatedly emphasized that prior presentation
of a federal question-not its mere presence in a case-is a prerequisite to
Supreme Court review. This is true no matter how grave the consequences of
adhering to prior-presentation rules. In those special circumstances when ade-
quate regard for federal rights requires deviation from the prior-presentation
requirement, two narrow and specific exceptions are available to excuse non-
compliance with the requirement. Those exceptions, however, are exhaustive.
Because neither exception extends to plain-error cases, the Supreme Court
lacks statutory jurisdiction to review such cases.
Plain-error review conflicts with voluminous and consistent statutory precedent
requiring prior presentation to the state court. The statutory provision
governing Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state court decisions, section
1257 of the Judicial Code,79 extends the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to only
those cases in which an issue of federal law has been "drawn in question" or a
federal title, right, privilege or immunity has been "specially set up or
claimed." 80 From the outset, the Supreme Court construed these statutory re-
strictions on its jurisdiction to require an affirmative demonstration on the rec-
ord of the state court proceedings that a federal question was both presented to
and decided by the state court.81 Modem cases have reaffirmed that proposi-
78. Article III creates Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in accordance with "such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; see supra note 58
(quoting article III).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) provides in part:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(I) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United
States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or law of the United States, and the
decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or
where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Consti-
tution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United
States.
Id
The original statutory provision regulating Supreme Court review of state court decisions was § 25 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87. Accordingly, the early cases concerning the scope of
Supreme Court review of state court decisions discuss that provision.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
81. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Newbold, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 511, 514-16 (1855); Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S.
(10 Pet.) 368, 398 (1836); Fisher v. Cockerell, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 248, 255-56 (1831); Hickle v. Starke, 26
U.S. (I Pet.) 94, 98 (1828).
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tion.82 Therefore, in a plain-error case in which the pertinent federal question
has not been presented to the state courts, the statutory requirements for
Supreme Court jurisdiction cannot be satisfied.
The cases supporting this proposition are not only explicit, but voluminous
and consistent. The United States Supreme Court Digest refers to well over
one hundred fifty cases reaffirming the proposition that the Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider federal issues not properly presented to the state
courts.83 Commentators accept the proposition matter-of-factly.8 4 In fact, prior
to Vachon,5 no case on point ever rejected the soundness of this fundamental
proposition.
The strictness with which the Supreme Court has applied the prior-presenta-
tion requirement provides an additional indication of the high degree of seri-
ousness that the Court accords the requirement. For example, the Court has
applied the requirement even in cases in which the trial judge relied upon the
federal issue in the opinion disposing of the case. 86 It is true that the cases so
limiting the Court's jurisdiction relied upon a now-abandoned rule that the
state court "record" did not include the trial court's opinion. 87 However, to the
extent that those cases preclude state court dicta about a federal issue that the
parties did not raise from serving as the basis for the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion, those cases remain good law today.88
The requirement that the record demonstrate affirmatively that a federal
question was raised and decided precludes review unless the Court is certain
that the state court decided a federal question.89 Thus, when the parties raise
dispositive federal and state law issues, but it is not clear which law the state
court relied upon in reaching its decision, the Supreme Court has held that it
lacks jurisdiction.90 Similarly, when the state court's opinion discusses both
state and federal constitutional grounds, but it is not clear which constitution
actually served as the basis for the court's decision, the Supreme Court has
held that it lacks jurisdiction.91 Even when the language of the state court
opinion strongly suggests that a federal question was raised and decided by the
82. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 206-07
(1945); see also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 799 (1972) (due process issue not properly presented for
Supreme Court review because not raised in state court).
83. See supra note 54.
84. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 531-38; M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TEN-
SIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 217 (1980).
85. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing unorthodox Vachon decision).
86. See Williams v. Norris, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 117, 118-21 (1827); Inglee v. Coolidge, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 363, 367-68 (1817).
87. See Williams, 25 U.S. at 118 (court's opinion not part of record); Inglee, 15 U.S. at.367-68 (same).
88. The Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction over cases decided by state courts only when a federal
issue was actually decided, see Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438-39 (1969), or when resolution
of the issue was necessary to the decision, Lynch v. New York ex rel Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934).
89. See Lynch, 293 U.S. at 54-55 (Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction when unclear whether state court
decision based on state or federal law and when state ground sufficient to sustain decision); Adams v.
Russell, 229 U.S. 353, 358-59 (1913) (same).
90. See L..ch, 293 U.S. at 54-55; cf. Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431, 439-44 (1948) (Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction to review habeas corpus petition when not clear that lower court's denial of habeas
relief did not rest on adequate state ground).
91. See Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965); cf. Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1965) (vacating and remanding rather than dis-
missing for lack of jurisdiction).
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state court, the Supreme Court has held the mere possibility that the decision
could rest on nonfederal grounds sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction.92
An indication of the importance of the prior-presentation requirement that
is even more revealing than its strict interpretation has been the Court's will-
ingness to accept the grave consequences that can result from its application.
The case of Williams v. Georgia93 provides a striking example. In Williams a
Georgia jury that had been selected in a racially discriminatory manner con-
victed a black defendant of murdering a white person.94 Although the names
of both black and white individuals had been placed in the box from which the
jury array was selected, the names of whites were on white tickets, and the
names of blacks were on yellow tickets.95 No blacks were selected to serve on
the jury that convicted Williams.96 After his conviction, Williams was sen-
tenced to death.97
Although prior to the trial court's disposition of the Williams case the
United States Supreme Court had declared the specific white ticket/yellow
ticket practice unconstitutional,98 Williams' court-appointed counsel failed to
object to the racial composition of Williams' jury until after Williams' convic-
tion.99 When Williams' counsel finally did raise the constitutional claim, it was
untimely and therefore not properly presented in accordance with Georgia's
procedural rules.100 Williams attempted to obtain Supreme Court review of his
conviction based upon his jury discrimination claim.' 0 ' The Supreme Court,
noting the presence of the procedural default, declined to exercise jurisdic-
tion,102 but remanded to the Georgia Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of the extraordinary nature of the case. 103 On remand, however, the
Georgia Supreme Court refused to reconsider the conviction,' 4 and the
United States Supreme Court was unable to prevent Williams' execution. 05
Plain-error eview does notfit within recognized exceptions to the prior-presenta-
tion requirement. When faced with countervailing considerations that
outweigh even the interests in strict adherence to the prior-presentation re-
quirement, courts excuse compliance with that requirement by applying one of
two narrow and specific exceptions. The exceptions, however, are not a gen-
eral license authorizing wholesale disregard of the rule. Rather, they are ex-
haustive. Neither exception contemplates anything resembling plain-error
92. See Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297-300 (1956) (declining jurisdiction to review
state court decision when possible to interpret opinion as involving only state law).
93. 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
94. Id at 376-79.
95. Id at 376.
96. Id at 376-77.
97. Id at 376.
98. Id at 378 (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 563 (1953)).
99. Id at 377-80.
100. Id at 382-83.
101. Id at 380.
102. Id at 388-89.
103. Id at 391.
104. See 211 Ga. 763, 764, 88 S.E.2d 376, 377 (1955) (affirming conviction).
105. See 350 U.S. 950 (1956) (denying certiorari). The Supreme Court must have based its denial of
certiorari on lack of jurisdiction. If the Court, in fact, had possessed jurisdiction but simply chose not
to exercise it, its actions would have been unconscionable.
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review, and this provides even more evidence that such review exceeds the
scope of the Court's statutory jurisdiction.
The first exception to the prior-presentation requirement is available when
the state procedural rule that has been violated itself raises a federal question
sufficient to serve as the basis for Supreme Court review. In such circum-
stances, the state law basis for the decision is not "independent" of the federal
issue, and the Supreme Court, therefore, has jurisdiction to consider the fed-
eral claim. For example, in Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama 1 6 the plaintiff
filed suit in a state court seeking damages under a federal statute for personal
injuries sustained as a result of the defendant railroad's alleged negligence. 10 7
The state court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff had not made
allegations of negligence with the degree of specificity required under state
procedural law.108 The United States Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction
and reversed, despite the state law basis for the decision under review. 109 The
Court held that the rules of pleading that controlled state-created rights could
not preclude the Supreme Court from interpreting a complaint that asserted a
federally-created right." 0 In essence, the Court held that the state procedural
rule was not sufficiently independent of the federal right so as to defeat
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court issued a similar ruling in Davis v. Wechsler, "n in which
the state court also attempted to defeat a federal claim by asserting the liti-
gant's noncompliance with a state procedural rule.' 2 In reversing the state
court's decision, Justice Holmes stated:
Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring
to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights,
when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the
name of local practice. . . . This is familiar as to the substantive
law and for the same reasons it is necessary to see that local practice
shall not be allowed to put unreasonable obstacles in the way.' 3
Justice Holmes' directive that assertions of federal rights must be "plainly
and reasonably made" indicates that the independence exception to the prior-
presentation requirement does not authorize plain-error review. Although
state procedural rules can become so entangled with the procedures inherent in
the assertion of federal rights that they lose their independence, this occurs
only when the federal claim is "plainly and reasonably made.""14 The inde-
pendence exception does not, therefore, purport to govern plain-error cases in
which the parties never even present their federal claims to the state courts.
The second exception to the prior-presentation requirement is available
when the state procedural rule that has been violated is not adequate to sup-
106. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
107. Id at 294.
108. Id at 295-96.
109. Id at 299.
110. Id at 296-97.
111. 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
112. See id at 23-24 (defendant objected to jurisdiction on basis of federal venue rules, but state
court held objection waived, under state procedural law, by appearance).
113. Id at 24 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
114. Id
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port the state court judgment. A procedural rule is inadequate if the rule is
itself unconstitutional or if it is not a genuine state rule of procedure. In Brin-
kerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill'15 the Supreme Court exercised juris-
diction over a federal claim that the state court had rejected because the
plaintiff had failed to raise it in the manner prescribed by state procedural
law.116 Because it was impossible for the plaintiff to have complied with the
pertinent procedural rule, the Supreme Court declared the rule unconstitu-
tional as applied and reversed the state court decision."17
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson18 an Alabama trial court issued a
contempt citation against the NAACP for refusing to produce its membership
lists in the course of pending litigation." 19 The NAACP unsuccessfully sought
review in the Alabama Supreme Court.' 20 In its denial of certiorari, the Ala-
bama court ruled that as a matter of state law, mandamus rather than certio-
rari was the proper route to follow in seeking relief.' 21 Despite the state law
basis for the decision under review, the United States Supreme Court exercised
jurisdiction. 22 It held that the state procedural rule the Alabama Supreme
Court relied on was so novel that it could not genuinely be viewed as adequate
to preclude Supreme Court jurisdiction when the petitioner had proceeded in
justifiable reliance on prior state court decisions.' 23
Neither prong of the adequacy exception applies to plain-error cases. Plain-
error review does not depend upon a finding that the state's prior-presentation
rules are either unconstitutional or nongenuine. Rather, plain-error review is
based upon the view that the Supreme Court, in sufficiently important cases,
can ignore noncompliance with state procedural rules, even if those rules are
completely genuine and constitutional. Proponents of plain-error review refer
to the independence and adequacy exceptions to the prior-presentation re-
quirement as if they were broad, general licenses authorizing Supreme Court
review in the Court's unbridled discretion.' 24 The exceptions, however, are
nothing of the sort. Each of the cases on which the plain-error proponents rely
fits neatly into one of the categories discussed above, and none of those cases
authorize Supreme Court review beyond the confines of the two specific excep-
tions that have been discussed.
Nothing could make the exhaustive nature of the two exceptions more clear
than the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Georgia.1 25 If the exceptions
were nonexclusive, or flexible enough to encompass cases beyond those to
which they are specifically addressed, certainly the Court would have found an
exception to be applicable rather than acquiesce in the constitutionally offen-
sive execution of a man convicted of a capital offense by a jury selected in a
115. 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
116. Id at 678-79. The state court refused to hear the plaintifis claim because the plaintiff did not
first seek an administrative remedy. Id
117. Id The Supreme Court found that no administrative remedy was available to the plaintiff. .d
118. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
119. Id at 453.
120. Id at 454.
121. Id at 455.
122. The NAACP argued that it had a constitutional right to maintain the secrecy of its membership
lists to prevent harassment of its members. Id at 462.
123. Id at 457-58.
124. See infra notes 224-40 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions).
125. 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
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racially discriminatory manner. Because the two exceptions that do exist to
the prior-presentation requirement are narrow and specific, they did not au-
thorize the Supreme Court to save Williams' life. Likewise, they do not author-
ize it to engage in plain-error review.
Cases cited in support ofplain-error review actualy represent examples of the
traditional exceptions to the prior-presentation requirement. Cases con-
struing section 1257 to require prior state court presentation as a prerequisite
to Supreme Court jurisdiction are noteworthy not only for their volume, but
also for their consistency.126 Nevertheless, the plain-error advocates argue that
several cases authorize Supreme Court review in the absence of prior state
court presentation.' 2 7 Even if the cases stood for the proposition that they are
offered to support, their small number is far from sufficient to offset the con-
trary cases, which outnumber the plain-error advocates' offerings by more than
a factor of twenty.'2 8 In reality, however, none of the cited cases actually sup-
ports plain-error review. Rather, each case holding is better explained in a
manner that is consistent with the traditional prior-presentation requirement.
Three categories of cases are advanced to illustrate situations in which the
Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction in the absence of prior state court presen-
tation of the federal issue. The first includes cases in which the Court is
claimed to have taken judicial notice of federal issues never raised by the par-
ties og addressed by the state courts.'2 9 It is true that language in one of these
cases refers to judicial notice,130 but extraneous language in a judicial opinion
should not be confused with its holding. These cases held that when circum-
stances indicated that the parties and the state court all understood that a fed-
eral constitutional case was being adjudicated, the Supreme Court was not
deprived of jurisdiction simply because the complaint did not make specific
reference to the United States Constitution.' 3'
The second category of cases in which proponents of plain-error review seek
refuge includes cases in which the federal issue was "necessarily decided" even
though it was never raised by the parties or discussed by the state courts. 32
Imprecise judicial language might be read to suggest the decisions are broader
than they really are.133 Again, however, each decision is better explained as
126. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (noting volume of cases construing § 1257 to require
prior presentation).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 204-22.
128. By my count, the plain-error advocates rely on seven cases. See infra notes 204-22 and accom-
panying text. As I have noted, there are well over one hundred fifty cases reaffirming the traditional
proposition. See supra note 54.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 204-09 (discussing Supreme Court's review of federal issues
under theory akin to judicial notice).
130. See Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 116, 142 (1863) (if one can take
judicial notice of anything, it is the Constitution).
131. See Furman v. Nichol, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 44, 56 (1868) (constitutional provision in dispute need
not be stated in pleadings if it is explicitly or implicitly clear from record that constitutional issue arose
and was decided by state court); Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 116, 142-43
(1863) (same).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 210-17.
133. See Eureka Lake & Yuba Canal Co. v. Superior Court, 116 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1886) (language
suggesting that mere possibility that federal issue was decided sufficient to establish Supreme Court
jurisdiction).
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one in which the parties and the state courts intended to adjudicate a federal
right, but failed in some technical respect to evidence their intent in the
record. 134
The final category consists of a single case, St. Louis, L Mt. & S. Ry. v.
Starbird,135 which is cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court can ex-
ercise jurisdiction over federal questions not raised in the state courts simply
because the federal questions are obvious.136 The reason, however, that the
Supreme Court was able to review the Starbird case had nothing to do with the
obviousness of the federal issue. Rather, an earlier decision of the state
supreme court, which held that all cases falling into the category in which
Starbird fell would be treated as controlled by federal law, 137 rendered incon-
sequential the failure of the parties and the state courts to address the federal
issue. 138 The United States Supreme Court recognized this prior decison when
it exercised jurisdiction. 139 Accordingly, Starbird is a case in which, despite
outward appearances, the state court did resolve the federal issue and thereby
provided a jurisdictional base for Supreme Court review.
In a final effort to escape the force of the two centuries of cases whose hold-
ings preclude plain-error review, the proponents simply assert that all of those
cases are inapposite because they were addressed to ordinary situations rather
than to the special situations in which plain errors are involved.' 40 The
Supreme Court has never articulated a distinction between special and ordi-
nary cases for the purpose of determining its jurisdiction to review decisions of
state courts. Assertion of the purported special nature of plain-error cases
amounts to nothing more than a tacit admission that two hundred years of
precedent does not provide an ounce of support for plain-error review.
In conclusion, the language of section 1257 requires that a federal question
be raised in the state courts as a prerequisite to Supreme Court jurisdiction-a
requirement that must be ignored if the Court is to exercise plain-error review.
An overwhelming number of decided cases have established and reaffirmed
that the language of the statutory restriction on the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion means precisely what it says. Although two exceptions to the prior-pres-
entation requirement exist, those exceptions are both specific and exhaustive,
and neither permits plain-error review. All these considerations indicate that
if Vachon was intended to authorize plain-error review, it was simply wrongly
decided. We have endured for quite some time without plain-error review,
and we certainly can continue to do so. Therefore, like article III itself, section
134. See Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1877) (Supreme Court had jurisdiction when
clear that federal issue raised and decided although not "formally" raised); cf. Eureka Lake & Yuba
Canal Co. v. Superior Court, 116 U.S. at 415-16 (implying that state court simply did not pay serious
attention to federal issue).
135. 243 U.S. 592 (1917).
136. See infra text accompanying notes 218-22. Although the Court cites other cases to support its
holding, 243 U.S. at 600-01, none of those cases fairly can be read as "obviousness" cases. Rather they
fall into the "necessarily decided" category.
137. See St. Louis, I. Mt. & S. Ry. v. Faulkner, 111 Ark. 430, 433, 164 S.W. 763, 764 (1914) (recog-
nizing that federal law controlled liability of carriers of interstate rail shipments).
138. See 243 U.S. at 597 (state court must be held to have known that federal law controlled).
139. See id at 597 n.1 (citing state supreme court case that held federal law controlling).
140. See infra text accompanying note 191-92.
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1257 of the Judicial Code prohibits the Supreme Court from exercising plain-
error review of state court decisions.
B. THE PRECEDENTS PERMIT PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW
In Vachon v. New Hampshire141 the Supreme Court authorized plain-error
review of state court decisions as a necessary incident to its primary function of
protecting constitutional rights. Marbury v. Madison 142 compels the Court to
measure all subsidiary legal requirements against the provisions of the Consti-
tution in order to determine the validity of those requirements,143 and Vachon
follows quite naturally from Marbury's command. The holding is direct, sim-
ple, and to the point. In those instances in which a federal right is at stake-a
right so important that it qualifies for plain-error protection-the Supreme
Court's obligation to protect that right cannot be defeated by a mere technical
rule designed to serve purposes of lesser importance.
The attempt by opponents of plain-error review to recast the Vachon deci-
sion as revolutionary and controversial misses the mark. The Supreme Court
created the prior-presentation requirement and carefully refined it, over a two
hundred year period, along one clearly illuminated path that leads directly to
Vachon. Accordingly, the asserted controversy in which the opponents of
plain-error review are so eager to wallow simply does not exist. The decision
is easily justified through resort to the applicable authorities.
In their reliance on historical precedents, the opponents of plain-error re-
view ignore three central facts. First, none of the precedents that they invoke
address the special circumstances present in plain-error cases. Second, those
precedents most closely on point can be explained only under a theory that
authorizes plain-error review. And third, other precedents, which they fail to
consider adequately, not only authorize plain-error review, but require it as a
matter of constitutional compulsion. Properly understood, the precedents-all
of them- plainly authorize plain-error review. This is true as a matter of both
constitutional and statutory law.
1. The Supreme Court Possesses Article III Jurisdiction To Correct Plain
Errors of Law
Article III of the Constitution extends the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.144 This permits the Supreme Court to review federal questions in cases
decided by state courts.145 Therefore, the mere presence in a case of a plain
error of federal law committed by a state court is sufficient to trigger the article
III jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Admittedly, language in a variety of
Supreme Court opinions suggests that prior presentation of a federal question,
rather than its mere presence in a case, is essential to the establishment of
141. 414 U.S. 478 (1974) (per curiam).
142. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
143. Id at 177-80.
144. See supra note 58 (quoting article III).
145. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 339-51 (1816).
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Supreme Court jurisdiction. 146 However, such language does not refer to the
Court's article III jurisdiction, but only to its statutory jurisdiction-a topic
that is discussed below.' 47 The decided cases provide ample support for the
proposition that the Supreme Court possesses article III jurisdiction to engage
in plain-error review.
The Supreme Court has never held that it lacks article Zlljurisdiction to engage
in plain-error review. The Supreme Court has never held, or even sug-
gested, that article III precludes it from reviewing a federal question that was
genuinely presented by a case simply because the question was not raised in
state court.148 Although time and manner of presentation may affect the desir-
ability of entertaining a particular federal claim, there is no basis for conclud-
ing that a preference for orderly procedures rises to the level of constitutional
compulsion. No case has ever held that it does, and such a conclusion would
be at odds with the language of article III itself, which extends the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to all cases arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United States-without any mention of mode of
presentation.1 49
The closest that the Supreme Court has come to holding that article III pre-
cludes Supreme Court consideration of federal questions not raised in the state
court system is its holding in Herb v. Pitcairn. 150 There the Court held that it
did not posses.s article III jurisdiction to resolve a federal question if, because
of an independent substantive state law basis for the decision under review,
resolution of the federal question could not affect the outcome of the case. 15'
Under such circumstances, Supreme Court consideration of the federal ques-
tion would result in the issuance of an advisory opinion, which the case-or-
controversy limitation of article III prohibits.152 That rationale is wholly inap-
plicable, however, to plain-error cases.
By hypothesis, Supreme Court correction of a plain error will change the
result; it will require either reversal or vacation of the state court judgment.
146. See, e.g., Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969) (Supreme Court lacks appellate
jurisdiction unless federal question raised and decided in state court); Mellon v. O'Neil, 275 U.S. 212,
214-15 (1927) (federal question must be raised and expressly or necessarily decided by state court);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 360 (1927) (same).
147. See infra notes 185-240 and accompanying text. Arguably, a statutory limitation on the juris-
diction of federal courts also amounts to an article III limitation, because article III grants jurisdiction
only "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art
III, § 2; see supra note 58 (quoting article III) and text accompanying note 78 (Supreme Court's consti-
tutional appellate jurisdiction defined by congressionally imposed statutory limitations). This section
treats as constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction only limitations having a constitutional
basis independent of that derived from congressional exceptions and regulations. The effect of congres-
sional restrictions is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 185-240. It should be noted, however,
that the power of Congress under the exceptions and regulations clause is not itself without limitation.
See generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953), reprinted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 330-61.
148. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 463-68 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Supreme
Court lacks constitutional jurisdiction to review federal issues not raised in state court, but failing to
persuade a majority of court).
149. See supra note 58 (quoting article III).
150. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
151. Id at 125-26.




This proposition is clearly indicated by Vachon, in which the Supreme Court
invoked the plain-error rule to reverse a criminal conviction that otherwise
would have been left standing.' 53 In addition, the Supreme Court has squarely
held that the advisory opinion rationale of article III has no application when
only a state procedural default is at issue-as is always the case in the plain-
error context. In discussing the constitutional significance of the distinction,
the Supreme Court, in Henry v. Mississippi,154 stated:
But it is important to distinguish between state substantive grounds
and state procedural grounds. Where the ground involved is substan-
tive, the determination of the federal question cannot affect the dis-
position if the state court decision on the state law question is allowed
to stand . . . . Thus, the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine is
necessary to avoid advisory opinions. These justifications have no
application where the state ground is purely procedural. A proce-
dural default which is held to bar challenge to a conviction in state
courts, even on federal constitutional grounds, prevents implementa-
tion of the federal right. Accordingly, we have consistently held that
the question of when and how defaults in compliance with state pro-
cedural rules can preclude our consideration of a federal question is
itself a federal question.' 55
Consequently, in not a single instance has the Supreme Court held or stated
that because of a procedural default it lacks constitutional jurisdiction to re-
view a state court decision.
Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Court possesses article Ill jurisdic-
lion to engage in plain-error review. Not only has the Supreme Court
never held that it lacks article III jurisdiction to consider questions of federal
law not presented to the state courts, but certain holdings of the Court affirma-
tively indicate that it does possess such jurisdiction. Prior to 1836 the Supreme
Court customarily resolved federal questions in cases on appeal from state
courts, even when the federal questions were never raised before the state
courts. Thus, in Willson v. Black-bird Creek Marsh Co. 156 Chief Justice Mar-
shall, referring to this category of cases, stated for a unanimous court:
This Court has repeatedly decided in favor of its jurisdiction in such
cases. Martin vs. Hunter's lessee, Miller vs. Nichols, and Williams vs.
Norris, are expressly in point. They establish, as far as precedents
can establish any thing, that it is not necessary to state in terms on the
record, that the constitution or a law of the United States was drawn
in question.' 57
Similarly, in Davis v. Packard58 the Court stated:
153. See 414 U.S. at 478-80 (conviction reversed on due process grounds when Supreme Court no-
ticed lack of evidence as to element of crime).
154. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
155. Id at 446-47 (citations omitted).
156. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
157. Id at 250-51 (citations omitted).
158. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 41 (1832).
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It has also been settled, that in order to give jurisdiction to this court
• . ., it is not necessary that the record should state in terms that an
act of congress was, in point of fact, drawn in question. It is suffi-
cient, if it appears from the record, that an act of congress was appli-
cable to the case, and was misconstrued, or the decision in the state
court was against the privilege or exemption specially set up under
such statute. 59
These cases leave little doubt that article III authorizes Supreme Court re-
view of federal questions regardless of state court presentation. It is true that
in 1836 the Court began to demand, in ordinary cases, prior state-court presen-
tation as a prerequisite to Supreme Court review.1 60 It expressly did so, how-
ever, as a statutory requirement and in no way undermined the vitality of its
earlier decisions establishing constitutional jurisdiction to consider federal
questions raised for the first time on appeal.16
The law of federal habeas corpus provides more modem support for the
existence of article III jurisdiction. The writ of habeas corpus is available, at
the behest of individuals held in custody pursuant to state court judgments, to
test the constitutionality of their convictions.162 Accordingly, the writ permits a
federal district court to do, on post-conviction review, what the Supreme Court
does on direct review-resolve claims that the state court committed an error
of federal law. The article III grant of jurisdiction to consider cases arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States is precisely the same with
respect to a habeas court as it is with respect to the Supreme Court. 63 Cer-
tainly, the Supreme Court has as much power as a federal district court to
correct errors of federal law. Therefore, the decisions of the Supreme Court
construing the scope of article III in the context of habeas corpus apply with
equal force to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction on direct review.
The federal law of habeas corpus is permeated with procedural require-
ments relating to the time and manner in which federal claims must be
presented in state court to secure federal court review.' In fact, those require-
ments are identical to the mode-of-presentation prerequisite to Supreme Court
consideration of federal questions on direct review, in that both normally pre-
clude consideration of claimed errors of federal law not first properly raised in
the state court system.' 65 However, the Supreme Court has taken great pains to
159. Id at 48 (citations omitted).
160. See Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 398 (1836) (Supreme Court lacks statutory juris-
diction to review federal issue in state court decision unless it appears from record or "necessary intend-
ment" that federal issue raised and decided in state court); see also Maxwell v. Newbold, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 511, 515-16 (1855) (same).
161. See supra note 160 (citing cases).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
163. See supra note 58 (quoting article III).
164. For example, a prisoner ordinarily must exhaust all state remedies before a federal court will
grant habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1976); see Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1201-05
(1982) (discussing exhaustion requirement). Failure to follow state procedural rules bars federal court
review unless "cause" and "actual prejudice" are demonstrated. See Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558,
1572 (1982); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1975).
165. Compare Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1201-05 (1982) (in federal habeas corpus proceeding,
prisoner must exhaust state remedies before pressing federal constitutional claim in federal court) with
Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368, 398 (1836) (on direct appeal, it must appear from record or
"necessary intendment" that federal issue was raised and decided in state court).
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stress that the state court presentation requirement is not a constitutionally-
based jurisdictional requirement.
In the landmark case Fay v. Noia,166 the Court explicitly considered and
rejected, over the strong objection of Justice Harlan, 67 the suggestion that
considerations of federalism deprive the federal courts of constitutional juris-
diction to consider federal claims not properly raised in the state courts. 68 The
Court's holding was more than a casual assertion of a collateral jurisdictional
principle. Rather, the length and vigor of the debate on the issue 169 demon-
strates that the Supreme Court majority wished to establish unequivocally
that, despite expressions of administrative expediency embodied in less potent
doctrines, article III of the Constitution does not make presentation of a fed-
eral claim to the state courts a prerequisite to the existence of federal court
jurisdiction to entertain such claims. Recent Supreme Court decisions have
eroded the force of Fay v. Noia in some respects. For example, Wainwright v.
Sykes 170 rejected "sweeping language" in Fay v. Noia that would make federal
habeas review generally available in the absence of a knowing and deliberate
waiver of the federal claim. 171 Nevertheless, the Court has reaffirmed the prop-
osition that in habeas cases there is no constitutional bar against federal court
consideration of issues not raised in the state court system.172 Because precisely
the same article III "arising under" language applies to both habeas and direct
Supreme Court review, article III establishes constitutional jurisdiction to con-
sider claims not presented to the state courts, whether those claims arise in a
habeas court or in the Supreme Court on direct review. 173
166. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
167. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing Harlan's dissent).
168. See 372 U.S. at 415-35 (reviewing historical accommodation between state and federal courts in
administration of federal habeas corpus and finding comity, rather than federal judicial power, as basis
for deference to states).
169. Approximately one-half of the majority opinion focuses on whether federal courts have power
under article III to consider claims not properly raised in the state courts. Parts II and III of the
opinion conduct an exhaustive historical review of relevant cases. See id at 415-35. In addition, Jus-
tice Harlan's dissent focuses almost entirely on the issue. See d at 463-68 (Harlan, J., with Clark &
Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (constitutional argument against Supreme Court review of state court judgment
based on adequate and independent state grounds).
170. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
171. Id at 87-90 (1977) (discarding Fay v. Noia "deliberate bypass" standard in favor of "cause and
actual prejudice" standard); see also United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1594 (1982) (reaffirming
"cause and actual prejudice" standard and elaborating upon meaning of "actual prejudice"); Engle v.
Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 (1982) (reaffirming same standard and elaborating on meaning of "cause").
172. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81-85 (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear habeas
claim even when prisoner failed to comply with state procedure; but Court imposes state exhaustion
requirement as matter of comity); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976) (same).
173. It is worth considering why no explicit affirmation of constitutional jurisdiction exists with re-
spect to direct Supreme Court review that is analogous to the Fay v. Noia affirmation of constitutional
jurisdiction for habeas review. The reason is that no occasion has yet arisen calling for an opinion
expressly upholding the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisdiction to disregard state court procedural
defaults.
Unlike the circumstances surrounding Fay v. Noia, which, in light of Justice Harlan's dissent, re-
quired the Court to address the issue of jurisdiction on a constitutional level, the circumstances sur-
rounding the Court's consideration of its jurisdiction on direct review have permitted resolution of the
pertinent issues on statutory grounds. Accordingly, consistent with the Court's long-standing practice
of avoiding unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-
48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing avoidance doctrine), the Court has relied on a panoply
of statutory requirements and exceptions, see infra text accompanying notes 185-240 (discussing
Supreme Court's statutory jurisdiction to correct plain errors of federal law), to set the boundaries of its
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Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Constitution requires plain-error re-
view offederal issues not raised in state court. The Supreme Court, as we
have seen, has never held that the Constitution precludes it from considering
federal questions not raised in the state courts, and the decided cases most
directly on point affirmatively establish constitutional jurisdiction to consider
such questions. Additional cases, moreover, indicate that the Constitution not
only authorizes Supreme Court consideration of federal questions not raised in
the state court, but in the plain-error context, requires such consideration.
In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill 174 the Supreme Court held
that the failure to present a federal claim to the state courts in the proper man-
ner could not preclude Supreme Court consideration of that claim on direct
review when such preclusion would deny the plaintiff adequate protection of
the asserted federal claim. 175 The Court ruled that its obligation to protect the
litigant's due process rights compelled this result.176 As a result, the Supreme
Court found not only constitutional jurisdiction to disregard the plaintiffs fail-
ure to raise its federal claim as prescribed in the state court, but a constitu-
tional obligation to do so.
The facts of Brinkerhoff-Faris were extreme. The complexity of the state's
procedural rules made it difficult-although not impossible-to raise the perti-
nent federal claim in the manner prescribed by the state supreme court. 177 It is
jurisdiction on direct review. It would, therefore, be completely unwarranted to draw from the absence
of a case directly on point any inference limiting the scope of the Court's constitutional jurisdiction.
In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), the first case to consider the scope of
the Court's jurisdiction under what was, in essence, its present jurisdictional statute, the Court carefully
limited its consideration to the statutory issues necessary to resolve the case. It expressly declined to
rule on the scope of the Court's constitutional jurisdiction. Id at 633. Since that time the Court has
continued to resolve questions relating to the scope of its jurisdiction through recourse to the jurisdic-
tional statute rather than the Constitution. For the purpose of ascertaining the existence of constitu-
tional jurisdiction, Fay v. Noia is analytically identical to direct Supreme Court review cases. It
unmistakably establishes constitutional jurisdiction to correct plain errors of federal law, even if they
were not properly raised in the state courts.
174. 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
175. Id at 679.
176. Id at 678. See generally M. REDISH, supra note 84, at 218-19 (constitutional concern for due
process required Court to hear federal claim not presented in state court); Hill, The Inadequate Slate
Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 959-62 (1965) (constitutional concern for due process required rever-
sal of state court decision based on procedural default).
177. In Brinkerhoff-Faris the state supreme court refused to consider the plaintiffs claim that the
value of its stock had been assessed for tax purposes in an unconstitutionally discriminatory manner.
281 U.S. at 674-75. The court based its refusal on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available before the State Tax Commission. Id at 675-78. The United States
Supreme Court invalidated the exhaustion requirement as applied on due process grounds because it
viewed an earlier state supreme court decision, Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 295 Mo. 298, 243 S.W. 887 (1922), as rendering futile any recourse to the Tax Commission.
281 U.S. at 676-77. Because Laclede held that the Tax Commission did not possess jurisdiction to
reassess the value of stock similar to the plaintiffs, it was unrealistic to expect the plaintiff to seek relief
from the Tax Commission. Id at 678-79. Indeed, the state supreme court itself overruled Laclede
when it imposed the exhaustion requirement in Brinkerhoff-Faris. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
Co. v. Hill, 323 Mo. 180, 193, 19 S.W.2d 746, 751 (1929).
An extremely cautious litigant could have complied with the Brinkerhoff-Faris exhaustion require-
ment notwithstanding Laclede. The United States Supreme Court viewed exhaustion as futile because
it read Laclede to preclude the Tax Commission from granting any relief. 281 U.S. 678-79. Laclede
could have been interpreted, however, to permit the Tax Commission to advise other state agencies to
reassess property that the Tax Commission could not reassess itself. See Laclede, 295 Mo. at 303-05,
243 S.W. at 888-89 (Tax Commission may advise other boards and ensure that assessment laws are
enforced). Presumably, if Brinkerhoff-Faris had requested an advisory ruling from the Tax Commis-
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but a small step, however, from the due process compulsion to disregard the
procedural default in Brinkerhoff-Faris to the analogous obligation to disre-
gard procedural defaults involving plain errors of federal law. As the Supreme
Court has held, the very essence of a plain error is its fundamental or constitu-
tional gravity. 178 Accordingly, the due process considerations that require the
Supreme Court to overlook a litigant's failure to negotiate an overly elaborate
maze of state procedural rules also require the Court to overlook a state court's
failure to detect and correct its own plain errors. Judicial preference for or-
derly adherence to procedural rules had to yield to the greater need to protect
federal rights in Brinkerhoff-Faris. Similarly, the preference for prior state
court presentation of federal claims also must yield to the greater need to pro-
tect federal rights important enough to qualify for protection under the plain-
error doctrine.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has always recognized an obligation to
overcome technical impediments that stand in the way of correcting plain er-
rors of federal law. As Justice Holmes stated for a unanimous Court in Rogers
v. 4labama,179 "It is a necessary and well settled rule that the exercise ofjuris-
diction by this court to protect constitutional rights cannot be declined when it
is plain that the fair result of a decision is to deny the rights."'180 The sentiment
expressed in that 19,03 opinion is the same sentiment that underlies the modem
plain-error rule.
Moreover, the Court customarily overlooks lesser doctrines of law in order
to protect important federal rights, such as those encompassed by the plain-
error rule. For example, it is well settled that state courts have the final say in
resolving questions of state law, such as whether a given set of facts gives rise
to the existence of a contract or how a contract is to be construed. 81 On nu-
merous occasions, however, the Supreme Court has overruled state supreme
court decisions concerning the existence or construction of a contract when it
deemed such drastic measures necessary to protect rights arising under the
contract clause of the Constitution. 8 2 Similarly, the Court has recognized its
power to review state court judgments regarding the existence of state-created
property rights when necessary to prevent impairment of those rights in viola-
sion, it would have exhausted available administrative remedies, and the constitutional question would
have been properly presented under state law. If the Supreme Court perceived such a reconciliation
between Brinkerhoff-Faris and Laclede, it apparently viewed the degree of precision with which La-
clede would have had to have been interpreted as too demanding to survive due process scrutiny.
178. See supra note 44 (citing cases).
179. 192 U.S. 226 (1904).
180. Id at 230.
181. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (state court renders final determination
as to severability of contract provision); Saver v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 548-49 (1906) (state
court renders final determination of terms and extent of contract); see also Murdock v. City of Mem-
phis, 87 U.S. (20 Wail.) 590, 635-36 (1875) (Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review state court
interpretation of state law); cf. supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing extent of Supreme
Court jurisdiction to review state procedural law). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at
439-526 (discussing Supreme Court review of state court decisions based on substantive law).
182. See Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544, 570 (1905) (reversing state court
determination that constructing elevated railroad tracks did not infringe contractually obtained ease-
ment to air and light); Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 443 (1861) (reversing
state court determination that bank charter not contract); cf. Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 433
(1929) (contract clause authorizes independent Supreme Court review of contract).
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tion of the due process clause. 183 In fact, the Supreme Court has even over-
ruled a state supreme court's interpretation of its own state constitution to
resolve a federal question relating to the compact clause of the Constitution. 84
If the Court's obligation to protect federal rights compels it to disregard state
court substantive rulings of law that affect the core of the state's sovereignty,
certainly the Court's obligation to protect rights as important as those encom-
passed by the plain-error rule require it to disregard the customary preference
for prior state-court presentation that, by comparison, amounts to little more
than a procedural nicety.
In light of the Supreme Court decisions that have established the boundaries
of article III federal court jurisdiction, no convincing argument can be made to
defeat the existence of Supreme Court constitutional jurisdiction to consider
federal questions not raised in the state court system. Neither the advisory
opinion restriction on federal court jurisdiction nor notions of federalism that
arguably are incorporated into article III divest the Supreme Court of constitu-
tional jurisdiction to correct plain errors of federal law, regardless of how these
errors are presented to the Court. Moreover, the importance of the federal
rights that plain errors abridge compels the Supreme Court to disregard proce-
dural impediments to the protection of those rights. If there are any limita-
tions on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to correct plain errors of federal law,
they must derive from statutory, rather than constitutional, restrictions on the
Court's power. Supreme Court construction of the governing statutory provi-
sion, however, reveals that no such restrictions exist.
2. The Supreme Court Possesses Statutory Jurisdiction to Correct Plain
Errors of Law
Supreme Court review of state court decisions is governed by section 1257 of
the Judicial Code. 185 That provision authorizes Supreme Court review of final
decisions of state courts of last resort subject only to one limitation: the deci-
sion under review must implicate a federal question.18 6 The language of the
statute says nothing about the stage of proceedings at which the federal ques-
tion must be raised, or who should raise the question-the parties or the Court
sua sponte.187 The statutory language requires only that the federal question
be "drawn in question" by the case or "specially set up or claimed."' 8 8 Because
all plain-error cases necessarily draw in question a federal right, they automat-
ically satisfy the statutory language.
By judicial gloss, the Supreme Court has added to this statutory language an
183. See, e.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944) (reviewing state
probate law to ensure no taking of property without due process); Broad River Power Co. v. South
Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540-41, 543 (1930) (reviewing state franchise law to ensure no due process
violation); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 653-54, 656-57 (1927) (reviewing
state law governing navigable waters to ensure no due process violation).
184. See West Virginia ex rel Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28-32 (1951) (Supreme Court reviewed
state constitution and concluded that state had power to enter into interstate compact despite contrary
state supreme court ruling).
185. See supra note 79 (quoting § 1257).
186. Id; Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1875).




additional requirement concerning time and manner of presentation. In ordi-
nary cases the federal question must be presented to the state court system in
the mannner prescribed by the state courts.189 However, in the extraordinary
cases in which plain errors of federal law have been committed, the Court has
dispensed with its own procedural requirement. It has done so to safeguard
important federal rights. 190 It is difficult to see how not adding gloss to a stat-
ute can be viewed as beyond the Court's statutory jurisdiction. This is espe-
cially true given numerous other Supreme Court precedents authorizing the
Court to review state court decisions despite procedural defaults.
Precedents governing ordinary cases do not apply in the special circumstances
characteristic ofplain-error cases. The opponents of plain-error review
point to a long string of Supreme Court cases to support their argument that
prior state court presentation is a prerequisite to Supreme Court review.191 All
the cases on which they rely, however, are inapposite because they involve
ordinary claims arising under ordinary circumstances. Not one of those cases
discusses the special considerations that are present when plain errors are in-
volved. A plain error is not simply a garden variety mistake of law neglected
by a lower court. Rather, it is a serious error-almost always of constitutional
dimensions-that, if uncorrected, would result not merely in an unfortunate
outcome, but in what the Supreme Court has termed a "miscarriage of jus-
tice." 92 For this reason, precedents governing the everyday presentation of
legal issues to the Supreme Court do not directly govern procedures in plain-
error cases.
In the one decision that did squarely address the question of what proce-
dures govern plain-error cases, Vachon v. New Hampshire,193 the Court chose
not to apply the customary prior-presentation requirement. 194 Rather, the
Court explicitly relied upon the plain error rule as authority for deviating from
normal procedures.195 Because prior-presentation requirements are designed
primarily for administrative convenience,196 the Court held that fundamental
constitutional principles outweigh those administrative requirements.1 97
Due process precludes mechanical adherence to customary procedural rules
when federal rights outweigh administrative or procedural concerns. 198 If the
Constitution requires the Court to disregard a procedural default, a statute that
purported to divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction after a procedural de-
189. See supra note 160 (citing cases that recognize prior-presentation requirement).
190. Vachon is, of course, such an extraordinary case. See also Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 502
(198 1) (Powell, J. concurring) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review plain error to prevent funda-
mental unfairness or infringement of important federal right); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 265 &
n.5 (1981) (same).
191. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
192. United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1592 (1982); see supra note 44 and accompanying text
(discussing standard for plain-error review).
193. 414 U.S. 478 (1978).
194. Id at 478-80.
195. Id at 479.
196. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
197. 414 U.S. at 478-80.
198. See supra note 174-84 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional basis for plain-error
rule).
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fault, of course, would be unconstitutional. Therefore, rather than strain the
language of section 1257 to accommodate a reading that would ultimately
prove unconstitutional, the Court construed the statute to permit what the
Constitution requires. Contrary to the suggestion of those who oppose plain-
error review,199 such a construction is hardly revolutionary or unprecedented;
it completely accords with established principles of statutory interpretation.200
Plain-error review is consistent with the Supreme Court's long-standing construc-
tion of section 1257 Not only is a reading of section 1257 that autho-
rizes plain-error review consistent with the canons of statutory construction, it
is also consistent with the many Supreme Court decisions construing that sec-
tion. Although the statute requires a federal question to be "drawn in ques-
tion" or "specially set up or claimed" in the state court as a prerequisite to
Supreme Court review,20 I those phrases are terms of art whose meanings in no
sense preclude plain-error review. Crowell v. Randell,20 2 the 1836 case that
formalized the prior-presentation requirement, itself refused to make the re-
quirement absolute. It held that a federal question was adequately invoked "if
it appears by clear and necessary intendment, that the question must have been
raised, and must have been decided, in order to have induced the judg-
ment. ' 20 3 Since that time the Court has been quite liberal in finding the requi-
site "necessary intendment" when the pertinent federal question was salient or
important.
The Court often reviews federal questions not raised in the state courts
under a theory akin to that of judicial notice. For example, in cases such as
Furman v. Nichol204 and Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co. 205 the Supreme
Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction to review federal constitutional ques-
tions that it deemed to be raised by the cases under review.206 Although the
parties.never raised the federal questions below, and the state courts never
addressed them, the Supreme Court inferred the presence of constitutional is-
sues after independently examining the records.207 Justifying its actions in
Bridge Proprietors, the Court stated:
If the courts of this country, and especially this court, can be sup-
posed to take judicial notice of anything without pleading it specially,
it is the Constitution of the United States. And if the plaintiff and
defendant in their pleadings, make a case which necessarily comes
within some of the provisions of that instrument, this court surely can
recognize the fact without requiring the pleader to say [it] in words
208
199. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55 (arguing that Vachon is unprincipled exception to
general rule).
200. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 76 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Court should construe
statute to avoid unconstitutional application).
201. See supra note 79 (quoting § 1257).
202. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368 (1836).
203. Id at 398.
204. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 44 (1868).
205. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 116 (1863).
206. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 49; 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 141-42.
207. 75 U.S. (8 Wal.) at 49; 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 141-44.
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The Court used similar language in Furman v. Nichol.20 9
On other occasions the Court reviews federal questions not raised in the
state courts by relying on an expansive view of when a federal issue is "neces-
sarily" implicated by the state court decision under review. In Murray v.
Charleston210 the plaintiff, a municipal stockholder, challenged the city's im-
position of a personal property tax on interest payments the city owed him.2 "l
The plaintiff raised no federal claims, the state court addressed no federal is-
sues, and the case could easily have been decided by the state court on state
law grounds relating to proper construction of the tax statute.212 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction, reasoning that the state
court's decision had necessarily considered the federal constitutionality of the
tax.213 The Court deemed its conclusion "too plain for argument" 214 and cited
Bridge Proprietors and Furman v. Nichol as its authority.215
Sometimes the Court is even more direct. In Eureka Lake & Yuba Canal Co.
v. Superior Court216 the Court resolved a constitutional question never
presented to or addressed by the state court because, after independently re-
viewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "possible" that
the federal question at issue fell into the "necessarily decided" category.
217
Such a possibility is always present in plain-error cases.
Finally, the Supreme Court sometimes reviews a federal issue not raised
below when the federal issue is so obvious that the Court is willing to impute
recognition of that issue to the state courts. In St. Louis, Z Mt. & S. Ry. v.
Starbird,218 for example, the Court reviewed the validity of an interstate ship-
ping contract under federal law even though the parties and the state court had
treated the case as a common-law contract action and had never addressed any
federal issues. 219 The Court addressed the federal questions because federal
statutes so pervasively governed interstate shipping contracts that the federal
issues simply could not be overlooked. 220 This was true despite the failure of
the parties and lower court to raise those issues. 22' The Court cited precedent
that conclusively established its power of appellate review in such cases.222
208. 68 U.S. (I Wall.) at 142.
209. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 57 ("[all courts take notice, without pleading, of the Constitution of the
United States").
210. 96 U.S. 432 (1877).
211. Id at 433.
212. I d at 439-41.
213. Id at 442.
214. Id
215. Id See also Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Elec. Street Ry. Light and Power Co., 172
U.S. 475, 488-89 (1898) (federal question necessarily implicated in record); Kaukana Water Power Co.
v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1891) (same).
216. 116 U.S. 410 (1886).
217. Id at 416.
218. 243 U.S. 592 (1917).
219. Id at 594.
220. Id at 597.
221. Id at 599-602.
222. Id at 600-01 (citing cases). The Court's reliance on these cases refutes the suggestion made
supra in the text accompanying notes 135-39, that Starbird is merely an isolated aberration.
In an effort to support the claimed unanimity of decisions precluding plain-error review, the oppo-
nents of such review argue that in all of the cases discussed in this section, the state courts and the
parties really were thinking about federal issues, even though they never told anyone about it. See
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The pattern that emerges from these cases is unmistakable. The Supreme
Court exercises appellate jurisdiction when it views a federal issue as so impor-
tant or so salient that the parties and the state courts should not have over-
looked it. The "drawn in question" and "specially set up or claimed"
provisions of section 1257 do not have the ominous, literal meaning the oppo-
nents of plain-error review ascribe to them. 223 Instead, like most legal provi-
sions, they are specialized terms flexible enough to permit just results. The
similarity between Supreme Court review in the cases cited above and
Supreme Court review in the plain-error context is striking. The Court permits
review in both instances precisely because the federal issues are too obvious
and too important to ignore. Accordingly, the plain-error rule fits quite com-
fortably within the Court's long-standing construction of section 1257.
Plain-error review fits within the traditional exceptions to the prior-presentation
requirement. Although several cases suggest that prior presentation is a
statutory jurisdictional requirement,224 many recognized exceptions to that ju-
risdictional requirement exist. These exceptions are designed to enhance
Supreme Court protection of federal rights. The plain-error rule is most sensi-
bly viewed as simply another exception, designed to serve precisely the same
function.
The asserted jurisdictional basis for prior-presentation rules is that disregard
of state procedural rules constitutes a state law basis for the decision under
review that the Supreme Court should respect, even though the case involves a
federal question.225 Not all state law bases for decision preclude the exercise of
Supreme Court jurisdiction, however. Only those state law grounds that are
both "independent" of the federal question and "adequate" to support the
judgment divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.226
In the plain-error context the issue before the Court is whether a federal
right is so important that it should outweigh a state's interest in proper proce-
dures-something that itself is a question of federal law.227 Thus, it is difficult
to see how the state procedural ground for decision could ever be deemed in-
dependent of that federal question. Moreover, because the "independent" and
"adequate" requirements are cumulative,228 even if a procedural ground could
conceivably be independent in the plain-error context, it would still have to be
supra text accompanying notes 126-40. In making this argument, however, opponents of plain-error
review forget their own argument that the federal issue must be presented on the record See supra text
accompanying notes 79-105.
Their attempt to distinguish Starbird is equally unavailing. They argue that the state supreme court
in Starbird tacitly considered a federal issue not raised by the parties or discussed in the opinion. See
supra text accompanying notes 135-39. Their only basis for this argument is that the court had spotted
a similar federal issue in an earlier, although completely unrelated, case. Id The argument is sheer
fantasy, especially since the Starbird opinion did not even mention the earlier case.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
224. See supra note 38 (citing cases).
225. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 463-68 (Harlan, J., with Clark & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
226. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965); Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120,
129 (1945); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210
(1935).
227. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (question whether default in state procedural
rule precludes Supreme Court jurisdiction of federal question is itself federal question); see also M.
RaD1sH, supra note 84, at 217-18 (same).
228. See cases cited supra note 226.
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adequate to divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction. The term adequate has
come to embody numerous exceptions to the ordinary prior-presentation re-
striction on Supreme Court jurisdiction.
A procedural default cannot preclude Supreme Court review if the proce-
dural rule involved itself violates federal law. In such a case the state proce-
dural ground is inadequate because the state law upon which it is based is
unconstitutional. 229 Because a plain error, by definition, is so important that
the need to correct it outweighs the desire to adhere to orderly procedures,230 a
state procedural rule that refused to yield to this balance would be unconstitu-
tional as applied.233 As such, the procedural ground would not be adequate
and could not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.
Even if application of the procedural rule is not so egregious as to be uncon-
stitutional, a separate line of Supreme Court precedents establishes that a state
rule that frustrates an important federal claim is, nevertheless, "inadequate" to
preclude Supreme Court review. In his often-cited opinion in Davis v. Wechs-
ler,232 Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated:
Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring
to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights,
when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the
name of local practice . . . . If the Constitution and laws of the
United States are to be enforced, this Court cannot accept as final the
decision of the state tribunal as to what are the facts alleged to give
rise to the right or to bar the assertion of it even upon local grounds
... . This is familiar as to the substantive law and for the same
reasons it is necessary to see that local practice shall not be allowed to
put unreasonable obstacles in the way.33
The Court went on to disregard a procedural default, even though it was not
prepared to hold the state procedural rule unconstitutional as a violation of
due process.3 4
Another array of adequacy exceptions exists when the circumstances suggest
that the state court may be applying its procedural rule in a manner intended
to circumvent federal rights. The Supreme Court has found a state rule "inad-
equate" when its formulation or application was suspiciously novel23 5 or ap-
plied with "pointless severity,' 236 or when adherence to the rule was either an
'arid ritual'3 7 or did not serve a "legitimate state interest. ' 23 8 The Court cre-
229. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93-95 (1955); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89 (1955).
230. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text (arguing that Constitution requires plain-error
review).
232. 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
233. Id at 24-25 (citations omitted).
234. Id; see also Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949) (quoting Davis v.
Wechsler).
235. See NAACP v. Alabamaexrel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958) (novel state law require-
ment of appeal by mandamus rather than certiorari not adequate to preclude Supreme Court review).
236. See Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 229-31 (1904) (state rule against prolixity in pleadings
inadequate to defeat federal claim based on racial discrimination in jury pool).
237. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958) (state rule requiring party to specify
particular clause of challenged ordinance inadequate to defeat first amendment claim).
238. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (dictum) (state rule requiring contemporane-
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ated these exceptions to the adequacy of a state procedural ground to permit
review when some danger existed that the state courts would not vigorously
protect the federal rights at stake. Plain-error cases pose precisely the same
danger. As the name of the doctrine suggests, plain errors are not only serious
errors, but conspicuous ones.239 Although it is understandable that a pro se
litigant or a party represented by only marginally competent counsel would
fail to perfect a federal claim, state court judges---especially judges of the high-
est state courts-have no excuse for not detecting and honoring the federal
claim. Accordingly, any case involving the unexplained failure of a state court
to protect a serious and salient federal right necessarily raises suspicions that
render the state procedural ground inadequate. Thus, because state proce-
dural rules applied in a plain-error context can be neither adequate nor in-
dependent, they cannot divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under
section 1257.
No one doubts that in the absence of an independent and adequate state
ground the Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction to review state court deci-
sions when a litigant presents a federal question to the state court, but the state
court neglects or declines to address it.240 In essence, plain-error cases are ana-
lytically identical to those cases, and Supreme Court jurisdiction is equally
present. Because of the salience of the federal right that serves as the basis for
invoking the plain-error rule, it is as if the itate court had been informed of,
yet chose to ignore, the federal claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court pos-
sesses jurisdiction over such cases just as surely as it does over 'other cases in
which the state court chooses to ignore a federal right.
In summary, the language of section 1257 permits the Supreme Court to
undertake plain-error review, and none of the decided cases undermine the
Court's statutory jurisdiction to engage in such review. Rather, the applicable
precedents support the Court's plain-error jurisdiction. Because plain errors
ous objection inadequate to defeat fourth amendment claim unless rule as applied serves legitimate
state interest).
The Court has also found state procedural rules inadequate when under the circumstances no reason-
able opportunity existed to raise the federal claim, see Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955) (state
rule requiring objection to discrimination in grand jury before return of indictment inadequate to de-
feat fourteenth amendment claim), and when the state rule lacked "fair and substantial support" under
prior state court decisions, see Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920) (state rule precluding
recovery of voluntary tax payments inadequate to defeat federal claim).
In addition, the Court has created a discretion exception to the adequacy of state grounds for deci-
sion. Under this exception, a state procedural rule is inadequate when the state court had broad discre-
tion in determining whether to apply the rule and the rule's application was facially discriminatory.
Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383, 389 (1955). It should be emphasized that Williams is the same
case that the opponents of plain-error review rely upon to show that we will tolerate consequences as
harsh as execution rather than excuse the failure to comply with state procedural rules. See supra text
accompanying notes 93-105. Their reliance on that case, however, is truly bizarre. The Supreme Court
did have jurisdiction to save Williams' life, by virtue of the very discretion exception that it created for
precisely that purpose in the Williams case itself. It was that discretion jurisdiction that permitted the
Supreme Court to remand the case to the Georgia Supreme Court for reconsideration, 349 U.S. 375,
391 (1955), rather than dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The reason that the Court chose to
dismiss Williams' subsequent petition for certiorari, 355 U.S. 858 (1957), remains a mystery of modern
jurisprudence. But it in no way demonstrates that the Court lacked jurisdiction to save Williams' life.
239. United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1592 (1982).
240. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252,254-58 (1957); Williams v. Kaiser 323 U.S. 471,477-
79 (1945). When the basis for the state court decision might rest upon nonfederal grounds, the question
of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is not so free from doubt. Compare Stembridge v. Georgia, 343
U.S. 541, 547-48 (1952) (Court has no jurisdiction) with Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551,
555-57 (1940) (Court at least has jurisdiction to remand for clarification).
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are, by definition, both salient and important, plain-error cases fall into the
categories of cases in which the Supreme Court is authorized to take judicial
notice of federal law or to deem the federal issues necessarily decided by the
state courts and thus reviewable. In addition, a state court's failure to consider
a federal right important enough to merit plain-error protection renders the
state court's action sufficiently suspect to warrant heightened Supreme Court
scrutiny. Accordingly, the state law basis for a plain-error case is neither in-
dependent of the federal question nor adequate to preclude Supreme Court
review within the meaning of the decided cases. Therefore, like article III,
section 1257 of the Judicial Code authorizes the Supreme Court to engage in
plain-error review of state court decisions.
III. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PLAIN ERROR RULE
A. THE CASE FOR FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
A comparison of the competing arguments made in Part II illustrates the
inability of precedential analysis to provide satisfactory solutions to legal
problems. Each side made its assertions, but they were like two ships passing
in the night. Each set of arguments embarked from a different starting point
and proceeded along its own course. Although the two sides occasionally ex-
changed potshots, they never really engaged each other.
I chose a structure and form for each set of arguments that was calculated to
lead to the desired result. But neither approach can meaningfully be termed
more correct than the other. Readers comfortable with definitional analysis of
legal terms and close adherence to precedent are likely to be attracted to the
arguments made against plain-error review, while those impressed by more
expansive characterization of case holdings are likely to be attracted to the
arguments in favor of such review. More demanding readers, however, will be
unsatisfied by both sets of arguments because both fail to justify their conclu-
sions in terms of anything meaningful. The characterizations that can be im-
posed upon selected case holdings have no significance in the absence of a
connection with some functional objective. The problem with precedential
analysis is that it fails to make such a connection. 241
It is better to analyze legal issues in terms of the functions that the pertinent
doctrines are designed to serve. Legal doctrines do not simply exist; they exist
for a purpose. Accordingly, resolution of a legal issue in a way that serves the
purpose of the pertinent doctrine is preferable to a resolution that frustrates it.
It follows, therefore, that legal analysis should attempt to identify the function
of the doctrine at issue and then determine what result best serves that
function.242
241. It is possible, of course, to evaluate precedents in terms of the statements that they make about
the functions to be served by the legal doctrines under consideration. Such use of precedent is in many
respects unobjectionable, but most precedential analysis is not of this quality. Rather, as the arguments
and cases considered thus far illustrate, standard legal analysis treats case results and statutory lan-
guage as if they had some meaning independent of the underlying policy functions that generated them.
242. For present purposes, what I term "functional" analysis does not differ markedly form the types
of policy analysis advocated by many traditional legal scholars. For a sampling of approaches to policy
analysis, see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 125-28, 162-68 (tent. ed. 1958); Fuller, supra note 48, at 431-38; Lasswell and
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Functional analysis is complicated by the fact that legal doctrines rarely
serve one isolated function. Rather, they tend to accommodate competing so-
cial policies. The contract doctrine of consideration, for example, does not
serve the sole function of limiting legal enforcement to bargained-for ex-
changes. As dilution of consideration requirements over time suggests, the
doctrine is more accurately characterized as one that balances competing soci-
etal desires.243 On the one hand, we wish to reserve our legal enforcement
resources for promises that are part of a bargained-for exchange because they
are likely to be economically useful to society. On the other hand, we wish to
protect reliance on promises under certain circumstances even though they
were not a traditional bargained-for exchange. The doctrine of consideration
reflects the way in which we have balanced those competing interests up until
now.244 A judge who understands the conflict is likely to analyze a contract
case better than one who has merely memorized the requirements of the doc-
trine and mastered the art of culling precedents that have factual similari-
ties.245 Understanding competing policy choices leads naturally to functional,
rather than precedential, analysis.
As I have indicated, functional analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the
analyst identifies the policy functions served by the legal doctrine under con-
sideration. Next, he or she balances the competing interests and explains why,
in terms of the facts presented, the result selected advances those functions.
This process requires both adoption of a position in the underlying policy de-
bate and defense of that position through persuasive argumentation.246 As a
result, functional analysis has two clear advantages over precedential analysis.
First, it highlights, rather than masks, the balancing process inherent in legal
decisionmaking. This permits greater public scrutiny of the decisionmaking
process and greater comprehension of the significance of decisions that are
made. Second, because the bases of a decision are disclosed, the decision is
more likely than a precedential decision to command the proper degree of
deference.
The degree of deference to which a legal decision is entitled properly de-
pends upon its persuasiveness. Because functional analysis in no way depends
upon the invocation of authority, the persuasiveness of a functional decision is
not artificially enhanced by an observer's attraction to the security of author-
ity. Accordingly, it is possible to disagree legitimately with a functional deci-
sion by challenging either of the two grounds upon which it is based. First, the
specified objective can be challenged as the wrong objective. A critic may sim-
McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J.
203, 203-06 (1943). The differences that do exist between my functional analysis and their "policy"
analysis are embryonic and unimportant to the present discussion.
243. The rise and fall of the consideration-based concept of contract is chronicled in G. GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
244. It is, of course, possible to specify other competing interests at stake, such as business expedi-
ency versus morality.
245. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a judge could decide which factual similarities were important
without reaching some prior conclusion concerning the competing functions at issue.
246. I have argued elsewhere that this is the essence of the judicial function. See Spann, supra note
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ply identify the competing policies differently. 247 Second, the result can be
challenged because it frustrates, rather than facilitates, realization of the de-
sired objective. A critic may simply balance the competing policies differ-
ently.248 Far from being shortcomings of functional analysis, however, these
vulnerabilities comprise its greatest asset.
The reason that legitimate disagreement about proper application of legal
doctrines is possible is that legitimately conflicting policies lie beneath those
doctrines. By focusing attention on the underlying policy differences, func-
tional analysis generates healthy public debate. Moreover, explanation of a
decision in functional terms provides information to the public concerning the
relative importance of competing policies at particular stages of our social de-
velopment. 249 This in turn permits proponents of various policies to take ap-
propriate actions in response to the decision.250 In fact, it is likely that the
debate facilitated by functional analysis is of more long-term importance than
resolution of the particular case at issue.251
The problem with precedential analysis is that it suppresses meaningful pub-
lic debate. Asserting that cases are controlled by precedent precludes the need
for explicit balancing of competing policies. As a result, precedential decisions
tend not to be justifie'd in terms of the policy choices that make them signifi-
cant. Often, they are barely justified at all. Their correctness is simply as-
serted through the invocation of authority. The intrusion of authority into the
justification process reduces the willingness of observers to challenge particular
decisions. Moreover, the consequent masking of judicial discretion inherent in
such a decisionmaking process enhances the artificial deference likely to be
accorded a decision. The precedential judiciary is portrayed as a passive, reac-
tive institution that does little more than turn the handle of the stare decisis
machine. There is no mention that the very same judiciary created the prece-
dents being employed and possesses the power to manipulate or overrule them.
Of course, precedential analysis can generate debate over which of two or
more lines of conflicting precedent is controlling. Unless such debate ad-
dresses the competing policies at issue, however, it is unimportant.252
Precedential analysis can be counterproductive because it masks when it
should illuminate, but that does not mean that precedent itself is useless. De-
247. For an example of the view that contract cases have nothing to do with economic efficiency but
relate solely to questions of morality, see C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS A PROMISE (1981).
248. Assuming that one agrees that the objective of contract law should be to maximize efficiency,
the question whether enforcement of the contract ultimately maximizes efficiency will almost always be
subject to debate.
249. Again, I view such public education as the essence of the judicial function. See Spann, supra
note 61. For example, in the mid-1950's society was told by the Supreme Court that the principle of
equality, which society purported to espouse, outweighed all of its policies favoring segregated public
education. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring unconstitutional "separate
but equal" school systems). Apparently, however, at that stage of our development, society was not
ready to be told that its equality principle outweighed its policies opposing interracial marriage. See
Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam) (mem.) (refusing to invalidate state court decision
upholding miscegenation statute), vacatingandremanding 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), motion dem
350 U.S. 985 (1956).
250. Some may wish to gloat; some may wish to plan revolt; some may lobby for legislation; others
may take an extended vacation.
251. See Spann, supra note 61.
252. See supra note 241.
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cided cases are useful aids to functional analysis. They can illuminate factors
that otherwise might not be apparent and illustrate consequences of particular
resolutions that otherwise might not be considered. In addition, the opinions
in prior cases can contain persuasive arguments to support their results. It is
only the use of precedent as authority that is objectionable because it deflects
attention from meaningful policy concerns. 253
This is illustrated by the present debate. Realistically, the question whether
the Supreme Court should exercise plain-error review turns on how we feel
about federalism-the proper balance of our conflicting desires for federal
protection of federal rights on the one hand and state autonomy on the other.
Yet, neither of the lines of argument developed in Part II had much to say
about federalism, and even when the term was mentioned, treatment of the
doctrine was superficial. The arguments made bold assertions about the
proper inferences to be drawn from cases without satisfactorily explaining
whether they were or were not on point. Neither line of argument directly
considered the proper relation between states and the federal government. A
better-reasoned analysis would result from explicit consideration of the poli-
cies embodied in the concept of federalism.
B. FUNCTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The plain-error rule permits the Supreme Court on direct review to protect
federal rights-generally constitutional rights-that otherwise would be ig-
nored. Yet because the rule negates the effect of state laws governing proce-
dures in the state court system, its application offends policies favoring state
autonomy, which also have constitutional stature. Nevertheless, those compet-
ing policies, properly balanced, should be resolved in favor of permitting
plain-error review because that resolution is most consistent with our present
views of federalism.254
1. The Policy Objectives Behind Plain Error Review
The first stage of functional analysis requires identification of the policy
objectives sought to be advanced through application of a legal doctrine. The
plain-error rule is merely a component of a larger complex of laws governing
Supreme Cort review of state court decisions. 255 The purpose of those laws is
to establish the level of Supreme Court oversight of state court decisions in-
volving federal rights that is proper within our system of federalism. 256 Ac-
253. d
254. My colleague Professor Tushnet has chastised me for asserting that plain-error review is consis-
tent with "our" views of federalism. He suggests that what I really mean is that plain-error review is
consistent with "my" views of federalism. He adds that use of the term "our" is a rhetorical strategy of
argumentation designed to win reader sympathy at the outset by suggesting the existence of shared
values, and that such techniques might have been appropriate in Part II-where I purport to do nothing
more than make arguments-but not in Part III-where I purport to do something more meaningful.
Professor Tushnet is certainly correct. My only defense is that I genuinely believe that "we"-at least a
majority of us-agree with "me."
255. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 500-21 (discussing legal doctrines that shape role of
courts with respect to relationship between state and federal law); M. REDISH, supra note 84, at 205-31
(same). See generally Hill, supra note 176.
256. See authorities cited supra note 255.
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cordingly, the plain-error rule is best understood as a device for furthering the
underlying objectives of federalism.
Federalism is a conceptual term connoting the degree of comity and mutual
respect thought to be necessary for harmonious relations between the federal
and state governments in a system in which each retains its own sovereignty.
Perhaps the most famous discussion of the concept appears in Justice Black's
majority opinion in Younger v. Harris.257 It describes federalism as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack
of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as
"Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound debates that
ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect
those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federal-
ism." The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights"
any more than it means centralization of control over every impor-
tant issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers
rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a sys-
tem in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It
should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born in
the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly
important place in our Nation's history and its future.258
As the quoted language indicates, the objective of federalism-based legal
doctrines is preservation of a delicate balance between state and federal inter-
ests. The proper balance often is difficult to maintain because of the intensity
with which each of the competing interests is asserted. That each interest has a
legitimate claim to constitutional stature increases the importance of striking
the proper balance.
Although the competing interests can be difficult to balance, they are rela-
tively easy to identify within the context of the plain-error rule. The plain-
error rule is triggered when a federal right is threatened because it was not
asserted in accordance with prescribed state procedures.259 If the Court does
not apply the rule to permit review, the federal right will be denied. If, how-
ever, the Court applies the rule to permit review, the integrity of state proce-
dural laws will be undermined. Thus, the competing interests are the need to
protect federal rights and the need to prevent unnecessary interference with
state autonomy.
The need to protect federal rights is of manifest importance. Marbury v.
257. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
258. Id at 44-45.
259. See supra text following note 1.
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Madison260 established that the courts must ensure that all governmental ac-
tions conform to the dictates of the Constitution.261 State governments as well
as the federal government are bound to respect constitutional rights. 262 The
supremacy clause requires state courts to honor even federal statutory
rights.263 Our desire to protect federal rights is so great that states are not only
subject to federal law, but state courts are also affirmatively required to protect
rights created by federal law.264
Despite the existence of state court concurrent jurisdiction over federal
claims, the federal judiciary has traditionally been viewed as possessing the
special competence and sensitivity required to make it the primary guardian of
federal rights.265 This preferred status of the federal judiciary stems in large
measure from distrust of state courts dating back to the post-Civil War recon-
struction period when both substantive federal rights and federal court juris-
diction to protect those rights were greatly expanded through enactment of the
Civil War amendments and implementing legislation.266 It is apparent, there-
fore, that our policy favoring federal court protection of federal rights is a
particularly strong one. It is firmly rooted in both our history and our
Constitution.
The competing interest in preventing unnecessary interference with state au-
tonomy is also generally viewed as a strong one, rooted in both history and the
Constitution. Whenever the Supreme Court exercises review notwithstanding a
state court procedural default, it offends our policy of respect for state sover-
eignty in two distinct ways. First, Supreme Court intervention implies that
state court protection of federal rights has been inadequate, thereby calling
into question the competence or sincerity of state courts. Although distrust of
state courts was originally well-founded, the Supreme Court recently has
stated that suspicions about state court willingness to protect federal rights are
no longer warranted. 267
Second, when the Supreme Court overlooks a state court procedural default,
it arguably denies effect to a legitimate state law in a way that is wholly incon-
sistent with our belief in separate spheres of sovereignty embodied in the con-
260. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
261. Id at 177.
262. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cL 2 (supremacy clause); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4-11
(1964) (protection against self-incrimination applies to states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-07 (1940) (protection of free speech applies to states).
263. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-94 (1947).
264. Id
265. See generally Newborne, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (arguing that signif-
icant functional and institutional differences between state and federal courts make latter better able to
protect constitutional rights).
266. See U.S. CONST., amends. XIII, XIV and XV; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (equal rights under law);
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (property rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(civil action for deprivation of rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (civil action for conspir-
acy to violate rights); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976) (conspiracy to violate civil rights constitutes federal
crime); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976) (wilful deprivation of rights constitutes federal crime). For a thorough
discussion of the political debates concerning the necessity for federal jurisdiction over rights granted
by the post-Civil War amendments and legislation, see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv-
ices, 436 U.S. 658, 665-89 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-87 (1961). See generally G. GUN-
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 974-75 (10th ed. 1980) (historical background of reconstruction era law);
R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTs 36 (1947) (discussion of Civil War amendments and
statutes).
267. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
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cept of federalism. On a practical level, exercise of Supreme Court review
despite the procedural default reduces the incentive for parties to comply with
state procedural rules by eliminating the major cost of noncompliance-sacri-
fice of the federal right. On a more theoretical level, Supreme Court review
completely negates a state law. The state law requires a litigant to raise his or
her federal claim in the proper manner if he or she wants the courts to consider
it. Exercise of Supreme Court review says he or she need not do so because the
Court will ignore that state law. Such an action by the Supreme Court is un-
objectionable if the Court is prepared to hold the state law unconstitutional as
applied. The plain-error doctrine, however, disregards even those state proce-
dural laws that the Court is not willing to declare unconstitutional. This is
curious because the Court has formulated the "adequate and independent state
ground" doctrine of Supreme Court review specifically to prevent the negation
of state laws that can result from application of the plain-error rule. Although
the Constitution contains no specifically applicable language, its structure
compels some degree of respect for state sovereignty and freedom from federal
interference. z68 Therefore, both of the competing policies implicated by appli-
cation of the plain-error rule are important ones that merit careful
consideration.
2. Balancing the Competing Interests
The second stage of functional analysis requires a balancing of the compet-
ing interests implicated by the legal doctrine under consideration to determine
how the doctrine should be properly applied to the facts at issue. Because of
the overriding importance of the federal rights that, by definition, are at stake
in plain-error cases, our policy favoring federal court protection of federal
rights outweighs our policy favoring deference to state procedural rules.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review plain errors of federal
law, despite state court procedural defaults.
The Supreme Court has not precisely defined the term "plain error," but it
has indicated that a plain error is serious enough to result in a "miscarriage of
justice" if not corrected.269 That characterization predetermines the outcome
of the policy balancing necessary to proper resolution of the plain-error issue.
If an error is sufficiently grave to fall into the "miscarriage ofjustice" category,
protection of the interest offended by the error is sufficiently important to out-
weigh our reluctance to interfere with state procedural autonomy, at least in
those isolated instances in which plain errors are present. To date, Supreme
Court invocation of the plain-error rule has been extremely rare.270 Therefore,
although the failure to apply the rule could have harsh consequences for the
268. See U.S. CONST., amend. X (reserving to states residue of power not delegated to federal gov-
ernment); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-52 (1976) (federal law cannot interfere
with integral functions of state government). But see EEOC v. Wyoming, 51 U.S.L.W. 4219, 4220-24
(U.S. Mar. 2, 1983) (severely limiting scope of protections from federal regulation accorded states under
tenth amendment).
269. See supra note 44 (plain-error review limited to serious and obvious errors).
270. The first time the Court explicitly invoked the plain-error rule to justify review of a state court
decision was in Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974). Since Vachon the plain-error rule has
been used only once to justify federal review of a state court decision. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,
265 n.5 (1981); cf. Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 502 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (joining Webb
Court's opinion with understanding that it does not depart from plain-error rule).
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litigant whose rights are at stake, application of the rule in those few cases to
which it pertains would have little effect on the overall operation of the state
procedural scheme.
The pattern that emerges from consideration of other aspects of the law gov-
erning Supreme Court review of state court decisions further tilts the balance
in favor of the plain-error rule. Although the Supreme Court has found limits
on its jurisdiction when a state court decision is supported by adequate and
independent state grounds,271 those limits are not absolute. In fact, the basic
restriction is perforated with exceptions. 272 Although none of the exceptions
alone legitimizes plain-error review, they collectively provide strong evidence
of the manner in which contemporary society has balanced its interest in pro-
tecting federal rights against its interest in preserving state autonomy.
First, the mere existence of so many exceptions requires one to view the
asserted policy favoring state autonomy with some skepticism. If the policy is
truly as important as we proclaim it to be, why do we find it necessary to
deviate from the policy so frequently? Second, that we have institutionalized
our frequent deviations by elevating them to the level of formal doctrines of
law suggests that cases presenting the need to subordinate state autonomy to
our policy favoring protection of federal rights are far from sporadic or aberra-
tional. Rather, the existence of these doctrines indicates that many such cases
have arisen in the past and that we contemplate the continued occurrence of
such cases in the future.
Third, the circumstances surrounding Supreme Court articulation of the
many exceptions that exist to the "adequate and independent state ground"
restriction are similar in one important respect. They suggest that we still do
not trust state courts to protect important federal rights adequately. In virtu-
ally all of the cases giving rise to the various exceptions, the state court as-
sumes the role of an unsympathetic guardian that considers federal rights to be
little more than obstacles to the achievement of some state purpose.273 Serious
institutional reasons exist to distrust state courts,2 74 and despite contrary rheto-
ric,275 the Supreme Court still seems to view state courts with suspicion.276 If
state courts, in fact, issue procedural decisions to mask hostility to federal
rights, our policy favoring respect for state court procedural autonomy ceases
to be a factor in the balancing process. As a result, the balance shifts dramati-
cally toward protection of federal rights because there is very little to offset our
interest in such protection. We have no cognizable interest in nurturing veiled
271. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing "adequate and independent state
ground" restriction on Supreme Court jurisdiction).
272. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 544-46 (discussing exceptions to "adequate and in-
dependent state ground" doctrine); M. REDISH, supra note 84, at 216-31 (same). See generally Hill,
supra note 176.
273. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457 (1958) ("novel" procedural re-
quirements used by state court to thwart protection of civil rights); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375
(1955) (implying that state court more interested in convicting defendant than ending state-sanctioned
racial discrimination).
274. See Newborne, supra note 265, at 1115-30 (discussing institutional characteristics of state
courts).
275. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976) (suggesting state courts no longer deserv-
ing of distrust).
276. See Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974).
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hostility to federal rights. When the state court has chosen to disregard a fed-
eral right that is sufficiently salient and important to qualify for plain-error
protection, one should question the state court's motives. By hypothesis, the
state court has not given the federal right as much protection as the Supreme
Court believes that it merits. Because the question of how much protection a
federal right merits is itself a question of federal law,277 the Supreme Court's
determination must necessarily prevail.278
Although it is relatively easy in the context of the plain-error rule to resolve
the competing interests in favor of Supreme Court review, application of the
rule is, nevertheless, doctrinally awkward. It puts the Supreme Court in the
position of disregarding a state procedural law, held by the state court to be
controlling, without invalidating that law. In fact, the very same awkwardness
exists whenever the Court exercises review after having deemed a state proce-
dural rule to be inadequate under one of the numerous exceptions to the "ade-
quate and independent state ground" restriction discussed above. 279 The
awkwardness, however, is easily eliminated. When the Supreme Court disre-
gards a state procedural rule to protect a federal right, in effect it holds the
procedural rule unconstitutional as applied. Because the competing interests
weigh heavily in favor of the federal right in both the plain-error and inade-
quate-state-ground contexts, the Constitution can be said to compel disregard
of the state procedural rule. It is true that the Supreme Court has not explicitly
justified its exercise of jurisdiction in terms of constitutional compulsion. That
is unfortunate, but it is hardly significant. Constitutional justification does ex-
ist, and that is all that matters.2 0
The same observation also disposes of any separation-of-powers objection
that could be raised to the exercise of plain-error jurisdiction. It is possible to
read section 1257281 as conditioning Supreme Court jurisdiction on prior state
court presentation of the pertinent federal issue. However, because the statute
contains no prior-presentation requirement,282 this reading is somewhat
strained. Moreover, the available case support for this reading cannot be
taken at face value because it comes from the same Supreme Court that has
declined to so read the statute in creating the numerous exceptions to the prior-
277. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (question whether federal right outweighs state inter-
est in proper procedure is itself federal question).
278. For another analysis suggesting that the degree of interference with a federal right should deter-
mine how much deference to accord state procedural rules see Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi andthe
Adequate State Ground- Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. RE,. 187.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 224-38 (discussing exceptions to "adequate and independent
state ground" doctrine).
280. Application of a state procedural rule in a particular context can be viewed as unconstitutional
either because it violates the due process clause or the supremacy clause. If, under particular circum-
stances, application of the procedural rule does not provide an adequate opportunity to raise the federal
claim, the rule is unconstitutional as applied because it violates the claimant's due process rights. If,
under the circumstances, application of the procedural rule will unduly interfere with congressional
desires for Supreme Court review, embodied in § 1257, the rule is unconstitutional as applied because it
violates the supremacy clause. One's preference between the two theories is likely to turn on one's
views about separation of powers. Those who believe that the judiciary should balance the competing
interests should be attracted to a due process analysis, while those who favor congressional balancing
should prefer a supremacy clause analysis.
281. See supra note 79 (quoting § 1257).
282. Id
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presentation rule. Assuming, however, that the statute could properly be read
to prohibit Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases involving procedural
defaults, the statute would simply be unconstitutional because it would inter-
fere with the Supreme Court's ability to protect federal rights. Separation-of-
powers problems never arise because the Supreme Court has the ultimate au-
thority to determine what the Constitution requires.283
Properly balanced, the competing policies implicated by the plain-error rule
favor finding Supreme Court jurisdiction to correct plain errors of federal law.
This is true even if those errors were not raised in the state court system. The
function of the plain-error rule is to strike the proper federalism balance. As
evidenced by other facets of the law governing Supreme Court review, that
balance is properly struck under the contemporary societal conception of "Our
Federalism" when the Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction over what it deter-
mines to be a plain error of federal law. Accordingly, despite whatever conclu-
sions might result from precedential analysis, a more meaningful, functional
analysis supports the plain-error rule.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that functional analysis is preferable to precedential analysis
because precedent is too susceptible to manipulation to yield reliable results.
Functional analysis, however, is also subject to manipulation. One can easily
disagree with the function said to be served by a legal doctrine or with the
degree to which a particular result serves or frustrates that function. In addi-
tion, because the essence of functional analysis consists of striking the proper
balance between competing policy considerations, one can always disagree
with the way that any particular balance has been struck.
If functional and precedential analysis are equally manipulable, two ques-
tions naturally arise. The first is why functional is preferable to precedential
analysis. The answer is that functional analysis is more honest. By refusing to
invoke authority, functional analysis does not artificially enhance the degree of
deference to be accorded the result. Functional analysis asserts nothing more
than that the result serves the specified function for the enumerated reasons.
Justifying a result in such a manner not only highlights the areas in which the
offered justification is vulnerable, but also invites challenge by the very expo-
sure of such vulnerability. This, in turn, facilitates public debate about legal
issues, which is probably of greater long-term importance than resolution of
particular cases.
The second question is more significant. Beneath the surface of a mode of
analysis that ultimately rests on nothing more than the subjective desire to
serve a particular function in a particular context, lurks the question whether a
283. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,
177 (1803).
A more serious separation-of-powers argument can be made that questions the scope of Marbury. It
may be that, despite their constitutional stature, federalism confficts are better resolved by an elected
legislature than by a nonelected judiciary. In my view, this turns on whether concerns about federalism
fall into that category of matters for which the dangers of legislative tyranny outweigh the dangers of
judicial tyranny. See Spann, supra, note 61. Resolution of that question is, however, beyond the scope
of the present discussion.
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given result would not be better justified on some more meaningful level of
analysis. If, as I suspect, one can never draw the distinctions necessary to offer
authoritative justifications, no more meaningful level of analysis can exist.
The propriety of any result can rest upon nothing more than the persuasive-
ness of the analysis offered to support it. Because persuasive skills are both
widely available and easily exploited, such a conclusion can be unsettling. Ul-
timately, however, because of the manipulability of all analysis, the problem
may be an inescapable one.

